Iran and the Houthis: Expanding the confrontation from the Gulf to the Red Sea

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Summary Houthi recruitment further complicates this dilemma. If threats to navigation in the Red Sea continue in conjunction with the Hormuz crisis, the international need for a comprehensive settlement that includes the security of sea lanes will likely rise, but the opposite outcome remains possible, as the continuation of attacks pushes the United States and its partners to expand the scope of the military response, enhance coordination with the affected regional powers, and put pressure on sources of armament, financing, and support.

It is not possible to understand Iran's maritime and regional strategy without stopping at the Houthis in Yemen, who represent one of the most important elements of its network of relations with non-state armed actors. Yemen's location overlooking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and its proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait give the Houthis the ability to influence a vital sea corridor linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

The strategic value of the Houthis for Tehran is that they add to the confrontation equation an arena of pressure that is geographically and functionally different from the Gulf arena. While the pressure associated with the Strait of Hormuz is focused on the maritime entrance to the Gulf and energy exports, the Houthi threat allows navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab to influence trade paths between Asia and Europe, and the movement of ships heading to the Suez Canal, in addition to threatening oil export routes on which some Gulf states depend.

Thus, the region faces a security equation on multiple fronts. Protecting navigation in the Gulf alone is not sufficient if the movement of ships in the Red Sea remains under threat, and securing one of the two corridors does not guarantee the stability of the other. This equation increases the cost of naval deployment and defense of energy infrastructure, and requires the United States and countries in the region to distribute resources and attention among more than one arena.

What is the Iranian goal in employing the Houthis? Potential Iranian strategic goals in this area can be identified across four interconnected levels:

First, expanding the scope of deterrence, as Iran seeks to make its opponents understand that directing a strike at it or increasing pressure on it may not remain confined within its territory or in the Gulf, as the presence of an armed ally capable of threatening navigation in the Red Sea geographically expands the potential dangers and makes escalation calculations more complex. What is meant here is not necessarily waging a comprehensive war on all fronts, but rather having additional options that can be activated or threatened according to the development of the confrontation.

Secondly, raising the cost of pressure on Iran. If Tehran is able to link the continued military and economic pressure on it to the possibility of disrupting navigation in more than one sea lane, it is trying to transfer part of the cost of the confrontation to global markets and to countries that depend on the stability of trade and energy. In this sense, the security of sea lanes becomes part of the negotiation equation, and not just a side result of the war.

Third, exerting pressure on regional opponents. The impact of the Houthi move is not limited to the United States and Israel, but extends to Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region with the aim of raising the level of security and economic threats, and it may affect the calculations of these countries regarding the continuation of the war or entering into new regional arrangements. Here, Iran’s interests in expanding pressure intersect with the interests of the Houthis who aspire to strengthen their military and political position inside Yemen.

Fourth, enhancing negotiating influence without bearing all the costs of direct confrontation, as the presence of armed allies allows Tehran to diversify its tools and maintain pressure in different arenas, while remaining room for political denial or varying levels of intervention.

From Hormuz to Bab al-Mandab: The Multiple Pressure Equation The importance of this employment becomes clear when looking at the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab as two geographically complementary maritime chokepoints, even if the nature of direct Iranian influence in each of them differs. Hormuz is located at the heart of the Gulf equation and energy exports, while Bab al-Mandab constitutes the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the road leading to the Suez Canal, which does not mean that Tehran can control the two corridors in the same way, or that threatening one automatically leads to closing the other. But the combination of Iranian pressure in the Gulf and the Houthi threat to the Red Sea could create a cumulative effect, such as higher transportation and insurance costs, rerouting ships, delaying supply chains, and increasing pressure on countries that depend on these routes.

The network of allies: from advanced defense to regional pressure. This approach reflects a shift in the strategic function of the network of allies that Iran has built over decades. This network was linked, in part, to the concept of “advanced defense,” that is, an attempt to remove the threat from Iranian territory and create the ability to respond from multiple regional arenas. However, the wars and changes that the region has witnessed have shown that relying on allies does not necessarily guarantee the prevention of attacks or the avoidance of direct confrontation.

During the current stage, it seems that the value of this network goes beyond the concept of traditional defense to its use in distributing pressure and raising the cost of the opponent’s options. Each arena provides a different type of influence, as missiles and drones create a military threat, sea lanes provide the ability to influence economically, while the political and military presence of allies provides regional depth that limits the ability of adversaries to deal with Iran as an isolated target.

Quoted from "Independent Arabia"