After Gambela.. Will the Map of Violence in Ethiopia Expand?

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Violence in Ethiopia is no longer confined to known conflict hotspots, as recent clashes in the Gambela region, near the border with South Sudan, have revealed a security fragility that extends across disparate areas. At a time when local conflicts intersect with more entrenched armed struggles, various forces with differing political and field backgrounds are beginning to seek common ground in confronting the federal government.

In Gambela specifically, the violence resulted in the deaths of 12 people and injuries to dozens, marking the latest episode in a series of security disturbances witnessed in several regions.

Meanwhile, Médecins Sans Frontières reported that its health center in Kuli received 88 injured individuals due to the violence that occurred on September 18, among them 8 who died before arrival, and 4 who died upon reaching the center, while it remains unclear who is responsible for the outbreak of the clashes.

The sensitivity of Gambela is closely linked to its location and demographic composition; it hosts over 400,000 refugees, most of whom are from South Sudan, and has witnessed clashes between local groups for years. In this context, a report by the Rift Valley Institute published in 2025 linked the escalation of conflict to competition over economic resources, alongside the impact of refugee influxes on local balances.

Thus, what happened in Gambella gains its significance from occurring within a broader security environment where competition for land and resources intertwines with local conflicts.

The picture becomes clearer when moving to Oromia and Amhara, where confrontations with different roots and parties are taking place.

In Oromia, government forces have been facing off against the "Oromo Liberation Army" since 2018, while the armed group "Fano" in Amhara has become a party in a conflict with the federal government since 2023.

As these two fronts continue alongside the tensions in Gambella, the list of regions facing armed disturbances in a country with multiple causes and parties of conflict is expanding.

Amidst this complex scene, a development has emerged that may give these conflicts a more interconnected dimension; seven armed and political groups announced yesterday, Sunday, the formation of a new alliance aimed at overthrowing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government and establishing an inclusive transitional administration.

The alliance includes the "Tigray People's Liberation Front," the "National Movement of Amhara," the "Oromo Liberation Army," along with four smaller groups: the "Ogaden National Liberation Front," the "Democratic Revolutionary Front for Afar Unity," the "Benshangul Peoples' Liberation Movement," and the "Democratic Gambella Peoples' Movement.","

The significance of the announcement goes beyond the mere joining of seven groups into a single political framework, as it brings together for the first time forces from Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and other regions, after having engaged in varied conflicts on separate fronts.

According to the participating groups, their goal is to establish a transitional government and create a charter to address security, humanitarian, economic, and political issues.

To understand the extent of the transformation reflected by this rapprochement, the background of the conflicts that led these forces to their current positions becomes evident. Some were not just adversaries of the federal government but engaged in direct confrontations with forces that are now part of the alliance itself. This paradox is clearly illustrated when revisiting the Tigray War, which erupted between the federal government and the "Tigray People's Liberation Front" in November 2020, amid a deeper struggle for power within the ethnically-based federal system.

The front had represented for decades the dominant force in the ruling coalition before Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018.

After two years of fighting, the war ended with a ceasefire agreement signed in Pretoria in November 2022 under the auspices of the African Union, but it did not resolve all outstanding issues, including land files, security arrangements, and the political situation of the Front. With tensions returning to Tigray in 2026, fears of a potential resurgence of fighting have escalated.

In contrast, 'Fano' was on the opposing side during the Tigray War, fighting alongside federal and Eritrean forces against the Front's forces, before the scene changed after the war ended, and 'Fano' itself entered into an armed confrontation with the government in Amhara since 2023, following government steps to reorganize regional special forces.

Here lies the paradox that gives the new alliance its significance: forces that have fought different conflicts and stood in opposing camps at earlier stages are now trying to coordinate their positions against the central government.

However, this rapprochement does not necessarily mean that they have overcome their differences or become a unified military force, as each group retains its agenda, demands, and different local context.

From this perspective, the map of Ethiopian violence appears more complex than just a multiplicity of fronts. While violence continues in Gambela, fighting persists in Oromia and Amhara, and tensions return to Tigray, there is an attempt to link several of these conflicts within a single political framework. Therefore, the significance of the alliance is not only related to the number of groups under its umbrella but also to whether it can transform disparate regional conflicts into broader coordination among the government's opponents in different areas.

If successful in this, the Ethiopian scene may face a new transformation; however, if disagreements prevail, the alliance will remain a fragile framework that reflects the complexity of the conflict more than it changes its course.