Hamas clings to its influence in Gaza

author

Amina Khalifa

The recent period witnessed the Hamas movement abandoning official authority in some areas of the Gaza Strip. However, its influence still exists through decentralized systems of governance and financing, allowing it to maintain influential roles in managing population affairs, even with changes in political and administrative arrangements.

Hamas's influence also lies in the extension of control to administrative, service and financial networks formed over the years, and not to official positions alone. Although the transfer of power is supposed to lead to a change in management and decision-making mechanisms, this may not be achieved if the old local networks continue to perform their functions.

In areas where Hamas has maintained greater administrative influence, local civil servants, according to the narrative regarding the administrative reality in the Strip, continue to perform tasks including population registry procedures, distribution of humanitarian aid, and management of some municipal infrastructure facilities, as well as limited collection of local taxes. The continuation of these tasks may give existing networks an influential presence in daily life.

This influence is not limited to the management of government facilities and transactions, but extends to the direct relationship with the population, who need official documents, aid, and basic services. This may also make changing the governance system more complex, especially in light of the difficult humanitarian and economic conditions that the sector is experiencing, as it is not enough to announce new institutions unless they are able to provide services on a regular basis and gain the trust of citizens.

Funding represents one of the main factors in the continuation of these systems, as the management of facilities and services needs resources to cover operational expenses, maintenance, and the provision of basic supplies. Rather, transferring administrative competencies alone will not be sufficient if the new institutions are unable to provide stable sources of funding, and establish clear rules for spending and oversight, ensuring that resources are directed to public services and limiting the use of economic needs in strengthening political or organizational influence.

Humanitarian aid occupies a pivotal position in the power equation inside Gaza, given that sectors of the population depend on relief support to meet their basic needs, and it seems that those capable of organizing distribution and reaching beneficiaries may retain an influential role. Therefore, any alternative system is supposed to be based on accurate records of beneficiaries, announced rules for distribution, and independent oversight that ensures that aid reaches its beneficiaries, independent of political considerations.

Questions about Hamas's influence do not stop in Gaza, but extend to talk about the movement's efforts to expand its presence in the West Bank. However, it seems that the difference in security, economic and social conditions between the two regions makes it difficult to assume the same mechanisms of influence will be repeated, as the opportunities for expansion depend on multiple factors, including the nature of political competition, the level of trust in institutions, and the ability of the existing authorities to meet the demands of citizens. Rather, a distinction must be made between existing facts and estimates related to the future of the movement.

It is assumed that any administrative transition in Gaza requires careful dealing with existing institutions and workers, because changing officials does not necessarily mean the disappearance of administrative structures and networks of local relationships, and the sudden exclusion of employees, without providing qualified alternatives, may lead to the disruption of services and increase the suffering of the population. Therefore, the need appears necessary for a gradual plan that guarantees the continuity of facilities, and defines responsibilities and criteria for appointment and accountability.

In this context, the establishment of an alternative governance structure in Gaza stands out as one of the paths proposed to change the administrative reality and reduce dependence on systems linked to Hamas, but the success of this vision remains dependent on the ability of the new administration to exercise actual powers, provide stable financial resources, manage services, official documents and aid, in addition to coordination with humanitarian institutions and parties concerned with reconstruction.

It seems that the main challenge facing any alternative administration is not only changing names or transferring specialties, but rather building institutions capable of working efficiently and transparently, and providing services whose direct impact is felt by the population. Thus, this path ensures the presence of effective oversight and clear accountability mechanisms, preventing the emergence of an administrative vacuum that existing networks or other parties seeking to expand their influence may benefit from.

Rather, the future of governance in Gaza will depend on the ability of any new arrangements to address the roots of administrative and financial influence, while maintaining the continuity of services and protecting the needs of the population. Hamas’ abandonment of official authority alone may not lead to an end to its influence, unless it is accompanied by building an institutional alternative capable of managing the affairs of the sector in a stable manner, providing basic services, and enhancing citizens’ confidence in the new institutions.