Opinion.. Erdem Ozan writes: The Speed Trap.. Why is the "Makkah Alliance" facing a tough test?

This article is written by Turkish diplomat Erdem Ozan, former ambassador of Ankara to Jordan, and the opinions expressed below reflect the author's views and do not necessarily represent the views of Ufuk News Network. The missile strikes and drone attacks that targeted Riyadh and Yanbu on September 19 represent another tactical escalation by the Houthis, a calculated move aimed directly at testing a new institutional framework: the Mecca Agreement for Collective Defense.

The agreement, signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, promised to establish a new regional security architecture. However, the strikes that targeted the Saudi capital and energy centers revealed, just weeks after its signing, one of its most significant structural weaknesses.

The problem here is not related to political will, but rather to a fundamental gap in response speed. Modern wars fought by non-state actors move at the pace of direct military operations.

Swarms of attack drones or volleys of ballistic missiles can be launched, tracked, and reach their targets within minutes. There are no parliamentary committees waiting to convene, no treaty procedures that need to be completed, or diplomatic channels that must be consulted before taking action.

On the other hand, institutional defense systems operate at a completely different pace. Building a defensive alliance requires establishing rules of engagement, linking radar and air defense systems that may operate with incompatible technologies, and creating joint command centers.

In peacetime, building such systems can take years. Therefore, they do not wait for defense agreements to mature and become operational, but rather seek to exploit the window of vulnerability that extends from the day the agreement is signed to the day actual integration between systems and military capabilities is completed.

By targeting Riyadh and Yanbu at this time, the Houthis have put the agreement to an early test: Will the coalition act as a single operational defensive umbrella, or will its response be hindered within committees and procedures? This reality redefines what the Mecca Agreement should actually provide; the Gulf does not need foreign infantry units.

Saudi Arabia does not suffer from a shortage of conventional forces. However, what it needs in the face of ongoing saturation attacks is the technical capability to withstand and continue.

Because repeated drone attacks deplete costly interception missiles in air defense systems at a rate that is difficult to sustain in the long term. Additionally, protecting vital facilities, such as King Khalid International Airport and oil pipelines, requires immediate integration between radar systems, electronic warfare units, and a continuous ability to replenish supplies and equipment.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan pointed to this trend in his recent statements to NTV. Ankara's strategy focuses on providing technical support on demand, intercepting drones, and joint integration between radar systems, benefiting from nearly seven decades of operational experience within NATO, rather than sending military forces into the field.

However, the direction of Turkish foreign policy itself adds an element of complexity to the equation. Turkey's diplomatic calculations have shifted towards a strict pragmatism driven by technology, as Ankara seeks to establish itself as an indispensable supplier of defense industries in the region by providing radar data, electronic warfare systems, and drone countermeasures, but without entering into open-ended military commitments.

The equation of (capability without commitment) may be suitable for Ankara; it takes into account the sensitivity of Turkish public opinion towards engaging in external conflicts and helps avoid direct confrontation with Tehran, with which Turkey shares geographical borders and vital gas supply lines. However, this caution may be interpreted in Riyadh as a form of interest-based balancing.

If Saudi Arabia feels that its partners are hesitant to provide support during an actual missile attack, the Mecca Agreement may risk turning from a mutual defense agreement into merely a series of defense industry export contracts. Under these diplomatic calculations, a clear economic reality also emerges.

While the Turkish defense industry sector is witnessing significant growth, the broader local economy still faces strong inflationary pressures. Ankara needs Gulf sovereign capital and investments.

Conversely, Riyadh needs Turkish defense manufacturing capabilities and electronic warfare technology to maintain the readiness of its air defense systems and ensure their supply. The interests appear to be integrated, but this depends on the alliance's ability to move beyond its initial operational establishment phase.

The adoption of a model that activates support based on the request of the host country, whereby it must submit an explicit request before activating the coalition mechanisms, provides important protection for national sovereignty. However, in an actual threat environment, where drones operate at low altitudes and from short distances, procedural delays may mean that the attack reaches its target before a decision is made.

Bridging the gap Therefore, bridging this gap requires surpassing traditional timelines for building coalitions. While the signatories cannot wait for the establishment of secretariats and formal structures to be fully completed, they will need to put in place immediate operational arrangements, including permanent joint command centers in Riyadh, and automated and immediate linking of radar data related to airspace, as well as pre-approved mechanisms for transferring and deploying counter-drone equipment as soon as any threat emerges.

The risks here are not limited to the issue of border defense. For Gulf economies that are funding diversification plans worth trillions of dollars, airstrikes on capitals carry direct financial costs.

They increase risks to commercial aviation, raise marine insurance premiums, and affect foreign investor confidence. Additionally, alternative energy routes, such as the East-West pipeline extending to Yanbu, lose part of their strategic value as soon as the security of energy movement through them comes into question.

Deterrence on paper will not intercept cruise missiles, and the success of the Mecca Agreement for joint defense will not be measured by the volume of promises made at its signing in August, but by the speed at which its members can transform what is written in diplomatic ink into operational defensive capabilities on the ground. When regional dynamics move faster than institutional frameworks, bridging the speed gap between decision-making and the ability to act becomes a prerequisite for the survival and effectiveness of any coalition. * About the author: Erdem Ozan is an experienced Turkish diplomat with 27 years of experience in diplomatic service.

He has held several prominent positions, including his last position as ambassador to Jordan, in addition to positions in the United Arab Emirates, Austria, France, and Nigeria. He was born in Izmir in 1975 and graduated with honors from the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University.

He has gained extensive knowledge of the political, social, and economic landscape in the Middle East, where he analyzed the complexities of the Syrian and Palestinian conflicts, including their humanitarian aspects and geopolitical implications. He has also participated in multilateral diplomatic processes, specializing in human rights and regional political developments.

His contributions include recommendations to enhance peace and stability through dialogue and negotiation in cooperation with non-governmental organizations and international organizations. He is currently continuing his studies on the Middle East while working as a consultant.