Sanctions Beyond the 'Economic Pariah' and Washington Closes Iran's Political Avenues

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The American insistence on transforming the strategy of "economic pariah" into a comprehensive strategy is not limited to implementing comprehensive and suffocating sanctions on the Iranian economy, but also aims to expand it to include dismantling all political and diplomatic channels that could provide an outlet for the Iranian regime, to exploit its geopolitical position to impose equations that serve its interests in its regional surroundings and on the international stage. Despite the revival felt by the Iranian regime due to the field developments that occurred in the Yemeni arena, and the control of the Houthi group over parts of the coast overlooking Bab al-Mandab, followed by this group attacking oil facilities, culminating in the targeting of the East-West pipeline, which Iranian-affiliated factions in Yemen and Iraq are trying to pass responsibility for, the rapid political developments and the political measures taken by Washington, and then by regional countries, made it difficult to deal with the American-Iranian crisis based solely on pure economic sanctions or based on balances prior to the war between them. Therefore, what the military confrontation produced in terms of a fragile ceasefire and the conclusion of an incomplete agreement did not prevent Washington from activating all levels of pressure that complete the cycle of economic pressures.

At a time when the Iranian leadership thought it had imposed the equation it wanted after the developments in Yemen, and that it could invest these facts to pass what it wanted in terms of conditions for establishing a new corridor in the Strait of Hormuz with Oman, the decision to postpone the Salalah meeting between it and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries with Iraq, at the request of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, disrupted Tehran's ambitions to dominate the issue of the strait and use it as a leverage in negotiations with Washington, which is pressuring it to fully open the strait without any conditions.

The American escalation did not stop at supporting the Saudi position in postponing or disrupting the Salalah meeting, but moved to politically besiege Iran and tighten the noose around it in the International Atomic Energy Agency, after depriving the Vice President of the Republic for Nuclear Energy Affairs, Mohammad Islami, from participating in the agency's meeting, especially since the Board of Governors had previously issued a resolution condemning Iran and accusing it of not cooperating transparently regarding its nuclear activities, which opened the way for referring the Iranian file once again to the United Nations Security Council.

The political isolation following economic isolation may not only be a result of military isolation and the losses inflicted on the Iranian decision-making system and economy, but also a consequence of the diminishing ambitions in its efforts to reactivate the negotiation track with the minimum of American conditions, amid a growing sentiment within this system that all the cards it invested in to push Washington towards returning to the agreement or memorandum of understanding, which was signed under Pakistani sponsorship, have not yielded results, and that options are beginning to narrow, as it now has to search for different means that may help it circumvent Washington's pressures and alleviate them.

The visit made by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to China is nothing but a result of Tehran's increasing feeling that matters no longer hold the potential for a breakthrough in the American position, and an attempt to exploit the window opened by Chinese President Xi Jinping with his announcement of his country's readiness to sponsor and guarantee the agreement between Washington and Tehran, especially since the Iranian insistence on returning to the Islamabad memorandum lacks a political and international lever capable of providing real and reliable guarantees to the American side, convincing it to implement any agreement, and that Washington's position has become clear in its unwillingness to return to the terms of this memorandum, but rather to move towards a new agreement that restores balance to any settlement that may occur with Tehran.

If the military system, which is controlled by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, while the Supreme National Security Council expresses it, promotes a two-phase strategy, the first of which seeks to exploit the U.S. administration's need for a kind of calm before the midterm elections, while the second aims to exhaust this administration until the end of President Donald Trump's term.

However, this system has overlooked that Trump's option and his administration's approach towards Iran has not reached its conclusion, despite having tried the option of diplomacy, then limited war, and afterwards the "disdained" economic sanctions. Yet, they still possess the option of open war, which aligns with what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu desires. They are not in a hurry to use or activate it currently, but resorting to it after the elections is not unlikely, as Trump may find himself in a position that forces him to opt for war in the two months following the elections, should the Republicans lose control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, or he may have more freedom to do so if the results favor him with the Republicans. In either case, his hand will be free to expand the scope of targeting, affecting infrastructure at various levels, which would compel the regime in Tehran to return to the negotiating table without preconditions and to implement U.S. conditions.

In light of these data and developments, it seems that the Iranian maneuvering window has begun to narrow regarding its desire to return to the Islamabad memorandum. Therefore, the options available to it, should Washington decide to return to the negotiating path, will not be close to this memorandum, but rather more stringent and dangerous. They do not stray from the pursuit of reaching an executable agreement not on its terms, or returning to a new round of war, which would be harsher and more severe than previous rounds, or in the case of exhaustion within the equation of "no war, no peace," which is the option that the Iranian system agrees is the worst. Its goal in all its actions in the region is to pressure for an exit from this equation or to avoid returning to it. Thus, Tehran's crisis is not in choosing between war and diplomacy, but in the mechanism and manner of agreement, and the limits of capability that prevent the ignition of a new round of war.

Quoted from Independent Arabia