What Could Drive Israel to Change?

Writer: Jamal Zaqout

Without any bet on what the Israeli elections will produce, the question that concerns Palestinians and should also concern Israelis is not only: Who will come after Benjamin Netanyahu? But can Israel change, what change does it seek, and what can drive it to achieve that?

The government may change, faces may change, and Netanyahu along with his far-right allies Ben Gvir and Smotrich may leave, but does that mean that Israel has truly changed? Or will what change is the image of reality and the way it is managed, while the facts that created the crisis remain the same?

Herein lies the difference between Israel after Netanyahu and Israel after the strategy that Netanyahu sought to impose through brute force. The former may mean changing the government, style, and discourse. The latter, however, requires a review of the assumptions that have governed Israeli politics for decades and across successive governments that led to Netanyahu's government: that the occupation can continue indefinitely, that settlement can expand without changing the nature of the conflict, that annexation can be achieved gradually without an official declaration, that military power can manage the Palestinian issue without addressing its political roots, and that Israeli security can be a permanent substitute for freedom, justice, and political rights for the Palestinian people.

The fundamental question is whether Israel can change without changing the environment that created this model and perpetuated it?

Israel did not emerge in a vacuum. It was established in a specific historical context, under exceptional Western support, before the relationship with the United States transformed into a solid strategic alliance. In contrast, the Palestinians emerged in the face of the Nakba and the accompanying uprooting and displacement, followed by occupation, settlement, and denial of their rights, foremost among them their right to self-determination.

Therefore, the question of Israel's capacity for change cannot be separated from the question regarding the environment that made this model possible and sustainable. Can a state change itself while the conditions that allowed it to manage the conflict by force remain the same? And can its behavior towards the Palestinians change without altering the rules of the relationship that governed this conflict?

Gaza has made these questions more severe.

What occurred during the genocide can no longer be reduced to Netanyahu's personality or the extremism of Ben Gvir and Smotrich. The independent international commission of inquiry established by the United Nations concluded in its report issued in September 2025 that Israel committed four acts that fall under the category of genocide, and it determined the presence of genocidal intent according to its assessment. In contrast, the International Court of Justice has not yet issued a final ruling in the genocide case; the matter is still pending before it, while the court has issued provisional measures since January 2024 under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Here, genocide cannot be treated, according to the description of the international commission of inquiry, as merely a 'Netanyahu deviation' that ends with his departure from power. When the issue reaches this level of international responsibility, the question becomes related to the state, its institutions, and its policies, as well as accountability and guarantees of non-recurrence, not merely a change in the prime minister.

Gaza, in this sense, is not just a test of what Netanyahu's government has done; it is a test of whether Israel is capable of reviewing the way it uses brute force itself.

On the other hand, the West Bank reveals the deeper structure of the crisis: settlement, effective annexation, forced displacement, ethnic cleansing, settler violence, and the use of Israeli law and administration to entrench a permanent reality on the ground. In its advisory opinion issued in July 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that Israel's policies and practices in the occupied Palestinian territory obstruct the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, and that settlement and annexation policies have created lasting effects, while also considering the continued Israeli presence in the occupied Palestinian territory to be illegal.

Here we arrive at the question that no serious discussion about a "different Israel" can overlook: can Israel change without reconsidering the ethnic-national character of Zionism and its stance on Palestinian rights?

How can a state maintain an exclusive national definition while controlling another people or preventing it from exercising its right to self-determination? The Basic Law "Israel – the Nation-State of the Jewish People" explicitly states that the exercise of national self-determination in Israel is "exclusive to the Jewish people," and it considers the development of Jewish settlement a national value.

Here emerges the contradiction that a change of government alone cannot resolve: can true equality be built between two peoples while maintaining the principle of national exclusivity, if one of the peoples is deprived of its right to self-determination?

The issue is therefore deeper than a radical government or a more radical discourse. It relates to the intertwining of ethnic nationalism with occupation, settlement, annexation, and military power, and what happens when these elements turn into a permanent system of control over another people. Ethnic cleansing and genocide, according to international descriptions and investigations, primarily raise the question of responsibility, accountability, and preventing the recurrence of such crimes. Hence, the West becomes part of the question of change.

Can Israel change if external support continues to insulate the costs of its policies from their political and strategic consequences? And can the West demand a fundamental change from it while continuing to engage with it under the same rules that have governed the relationship for decades?

This does not mean that Israel has lost its strategic value to the West, nor that the alliances on which its international relations were built have ended. However, Israel can, at the same time, remain a strategic ally while becoming an increasingly political, legal, and moral problem for its allies.

Here the question changes: not only what does Israel want from the West, but what does the West want from Israel?

This leads to the ongoing transformations in the international system. The world in which Israel was born is not the same world. The balance of power is changing, the international system is moving towards greater multipolarity, the Middle East is rearranging its relations and interests, and Arab and regional countries are expanding their margins in dealing with major powers. In contrast, the U.S.-Israeli relationship remains deep, meaning that the transformation has not reached the point of rupture or abandonment of Israel. However, the significance of this transformation lies not in that it will automatically force Israel to change, but in that it may change the cost of not changing.

As long as Israel can obtain weapons and political support, maintain its strategic relationships, and continue its regional integration without paying a price commensurate with the continuation of occupation, settlement, and annexation, there will not necessarily be a sufficient incentive to review the essence of its policies. However, if these policies become an obstacle to its relationships with its allies, to its regional integration, and to its international standing, then the external environment itself begins to produce pressure for change.

From here, the question is not only: Are the Israelis ready for change? But: Has the world changed enough for Israel to be compelled to reconsider the way it sees itself, its role, and its surroundings? Real change may begin from within Israel, but it requires a different regional and international environment, a change in Israel's relationship with its allies, a change in the position of the Palestinian issue within the international system, and a redefinition of the concept of security itself.

Security based on the continued control over another people cannot be the foundation for a historical settlement. Military power, no matter how great, cannot eliminate a people's right to self-determination, nor can it resolve a political conflict solely through force.

Therefore, if a new Israeli government comes to power that is more moderate in its rhetoric, restores its relationships with Europe and Washington, and manages to reintegrate Israel into the region, but maintains the occupation, settlement, and actual annexation, does not stop the displacement and the terror of settlers, does not recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, and does not open the door for accountability for the crimes committed, what has actually changed? Israel's image may be "beautified," while the reality remains the same.

This is the real danger: that the results of war, destruction, ethnic cleansing, and genocide become "new facts" that are dealt with as a starting point, rather than being subject to accountability and guarantees to prevent their recurrence.

Israel's reward for changing its government cannot be the rehabilitation of its image. The historical settlement does not begin with rehabilitating Israel, nor with a request for Palestinians to accept the results imposed by force as a new starting point. It begins with recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and ending the occupation, and confronting the historical tragedy that began with the Nakba and the accompanying uprooting, displacement, and deprivation of rights.

Therefore, the question that should precede the discussion about "Israel after Netanyahu" is not who will come after him, nor even whether the next government will be more moderate. The question is: Can Israel change without changing the environment that created it? And can it ask the world to rehabilitate its image without first rehabilitating its relationship with law, rights, and justice?

And can it remain a superior military power without realizing that military superiority cannot be a permanent substitute for a political solution?

In the end, Israeli change may be possible. However, it will not occur in isolation from changes in the regional and international environment, nor without redefining the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, between security and freedom, and between power and law.

The historical question is not whether Israel will change its government, but whether it is capable of changing itself.