From Muscat to Salalah... The Problem is in Tehran!

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The Sultanate of Oman called for a meeting of the foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Iraq, and Iran, which was scheduled to be held in Salalah on Monday, September 14. About forty-eight hours before the meeting, Bahrain announced that it would not attend and explained the reasons for its position. Then, just hours before the supposed time, Oman announced the postponement of the meeting. In my opinion, the postponement is closer to cancellation, as the idea itself was not realistic under the current circumstances.

Since the announcement of the invitation, the meeting in Muscat in November 1975 came back to my memory. On that day, the Gulf countries, Iraq, and the Shah of Iran met, and the idea was also to search for a formula for regional security. The meeting failed because Tehran wanted to be the dominant power, not a partner. It wanted to exclude other powers from the security equation to become the largest power that determines the limits of movement for others. After more than half a century, the regime in Iran has changed, but something important has not changed: the view of the neighborhood.

The paradox is that Iran, which talks about common security, is the same country that has built for decades military and political tools of influence in several Arab countries and has used them when needed to pressure its neighbors. Therefore, the call for dialogue is not enough. What is required first is for the invitees to know: with which Iran will they negotiate? This question has become more important today. Iran is no longer Khomeini's Iran, nor even Khamenei's Iran. There was a clear summit at the top of the pyramid in the past. We can disagree with it, but we know where the decision is made and who has the final word. Today, the scene has changed.

After the death of Ali Khamenei last February and the rise of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Iranian regime entered a new phase. The new leader is almost absent from the public sphere, while the space of the Revolutionary Guard has expanded, and the government headed by Masoud Bezhakian is trying to deal with a struggling economy, a worried society, and extremely complicated foreign relations. We now face a multi-headed Iran. There is the leader and his office, there is the Revolutionary Guard and its interests and institutions, there is the parliament and the hardliners within it, and there is the president and his government. Each party has its calculations, and it is not certain that what one of them says binds the others.

Here lies the problem of any regional conference. Let's assume that the Salalah meeting took place, and the ministers reached understandings regarding non-interference, respecting the sovereignty of states, stopping aggressions, and building trust. Who can guarantee their implementation?

Can the Iranian foreign minister commit on behalf of the Revolutionary Guard? Can the government prevent a military or security entity from making a decision that contradicts what has been signed? Can President Bezhakian provide his neighbors with a guarantee that what he says today will not be undermined by another power tomorrow? These are not theoretical questions. They are at the heart of the problem.

Diplomacy requires a party capable of making decisions and implementing them. However, the multiplicity of power centers makes an agreement with one party merely the beginning of a problem with another party. That is why I was not surprised by the postponement of the Salalah meeting. Perhaps not holding it is better than a meeting that ends with a collective statement and a polished communiqué, only for everyone to return to the same point.

From Muscat 1975 to Salalah 2026, much has changed in the region. The Gulf states have changed, Iraq has changed, and the world has changed. As for Iran, it is still seeking a position of dominance more than it is seeking a position of partnership. The situation has become more complicated today: we no longer know which head in Tehran has the final word. That is the dilemma.