Do the Rules of Conflict Change? The Middle East Faces a Redefinition of the Regional System and the Impact of American Transformations on the Palestinian Cause

Author: Dr. Ashraf Akka

In September 2026, the eighty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly was not just an annual platform for speeches by world leaders, but seemed closer to a mirror reflecting a deeper transformation in the international and regional systems. In New York, U.S. President Donald Trump affirmed that 'America is back,' linking American power to the protection of interests and confronting threats, while United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres emphasized that power must be constrained by law, warning that crises in the Middle East have become intertwined in a way that threatens the international system itself.

Between the two speeches, the real question emerges that transcends the issue of the decline or continuation of American hegemony: Is the way the United States exercises its influence changing, and does this lead to a reshaping of the rules of regional conflict?

Talking about the end of American hegemony seems premature, but discussing its continuation in the same form appears further from reality. The United States has not exited the Middle East, nor has it relinquished its central position in the region's security and major issues, but it has begun to operate in a more complex environment; powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel, along with Russia and China, are no longer just parties receiving the rules of the regional system, but have begun to seek varying degrees of influence in shaping them.

Thus, the ongoing transformation cannot be reduced to an 'American vacuum,' but rather to a redistribution of sources of power and influence, transitioning from a system where one party can decisively influence the paths of conflict to a system with multiple centers of power capable of influencing, negotiating, and obstructing.

Trump's speech at the United Nations is significant not only for what it affirmed about American power but also for what it reveals about the philosophy of current American policy: restoring power, protecting American interests, using force when necessary, and reducing constraints that Washington sees as hindering its movement. However, the strategic problem is not in the United States possessing power, but in transforming that power into stable and sustainable political arrangements. The Middle East has proven in recent years that military superiority does not necessarily yield a political settlement, and that the ability to intervene does not mean the ability to manage outcomes alone.

Therefore, Washington seems to be facing a different equation: it can intervene, but it needs partners to manage the outcomes. Gaza is at the heart of this equation; the United States remains a central party in its arrangements, while Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey play essential roles. Meanwhile, several Arab and Islamic countries gathered in New York to discuss implementing the Gaza plan, maintaining the ceasefire, and moving to recovery and reconstruction phases. This reflects a potential shift from unilateral hegemony to a multilateral management of conflict; it is not yet a complete regional system, but it indicates that the region is beginning to seek greater capacity to manage its crises rather than merely receiving arrangements from others.

In this context, the General Assembly meetings revealed the widening gap between the logic of power and the logic of legitimacy. Palestine received broad support within the General Assembly, while Guterres affirmed that the two-state solution based on the borders of 1967 remains the path upon which the international community relies, warning of the erosion of the conditions for the establishment of a Palestinian state, calling for a halt to settlement activities, preventing annexation, and supporting Palestinian institutions, while emphasizing the necessity for Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem to remain within a single Palestinian political framework.

Here lies the paradox: while Israel and the United States advance with the logic of security and power, a large part of the international community advances with the logic of legitimacy, law, and the Palestinian state. But the real question is: can Arab states and international powers translate this political and legal gap into actual arrangements on the ground?

Gaza is the test for the entire regional system, as it is the place where international, regional, and Palestinian transformations intersect. What is happening there is no longer just a ceasefire or aid or reconstruction; it has become a question about 'the day after': Who governs Gaza? Who provides security? Who manages reconstruction? And what is the nature of the relationship between Gaza and the West Bank?

If the international community succeeds in reconstructing Gaza and arranging its security and administrative conditions, while settlement and annexation continue in the West Bank, the result will be a reproduction of the conflict with new tools. However, if the reconstruction of Gaza is linked to a political path that reunifies Palestinian territories and leads to self-determination and statehood, Gaza could become an entry point for reshaping the rules of conflict.

Here, the Israeli challenge also emerges; reducing the conflict to security and preventing future threats does not provide a political answer to its roots. Israeli security cannot be separated from regional security, and regional security cannot be separated from the continuation of the Palestinian conflict, and the Palestinian conflict cannot be reduced to Gaza alone. Thus, the continuation of settlement, annexation, and the Judaization of Jerusalem, along with weakening the Palestinian Authority, will make any security arrangement in Gaza fragile, as the roots of the conflict will remain present in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

But the question is not only about what Israel or the United States does, but about what the Palestinians themselves can do at this pivotal moment. The Palestinian cause has significant international currency, but diplomatic currency does not automatically translate into political power. Therefore, the Palestinian leadership and factions need to transition from managing division to managing the phase, from reaction to initiative-making, and from representation to rebuilding legitimacy.

This begins with four interconnected transformations: unifying the Palestinian political reference, rebuilding legitimacy through an electoral and institutional path, unifying national decision-making while preserving political plurality, and preventing Gaza from becoming an administrative entity separate from the Palestinian national project.

As for the factions, what is required is not to eliminate their political differences, but to redefine their function within the upcoming Palestinian system: from competing for power to participating in building the political system, through a national reference, a common program, and a clear decision-making mechanism, while maintaining political competition within institutions and elections.

The Palestinians have multiple tools to influence: diplomacy, international law, rebuilding legitimacy, Arab joint action, and building international alliances. However, the challenge is to transition from political recognition to practical commitments, from statements to mechanisms of influence, and from Arab political support to a more effective Arab role in ensuring any future settlement.

Here, the most difficult Palestinian question arises: Who has the right to define the Palestinian national interest in the upcoming phase? If this question remains open, other powers will participate in defining 'the day after' according to their interests. However, if the Palestinians succeed in rebuilding a unified national decision-making center, they will enter the process of reshaping the region as a political party, not merely as a subject of others' arrangements.

In light of this, the region seems to be facing three potential paths: reproducing American hegemony in a form more reliant on regional partners, transitioning to a multi-centered regional system, or entering a hybrid, turbulent system where major and regional powers intertwine without stable rules.

In all these paths, Palestine remains a key variable, not a marginal one. If it becomes part of the process of rebuilding the regional system, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict could become an entry point for a broader settlement. However, if it remains merely a security and humanitarian file, while the maps of the region continue to change, the risk of reproducing the conflict will remain.

The Middle East is not simply entering a post-American hegemony phase, but a phase beyond the monopoly of regional decision-making. The United States will remain a key player, but it will operate within a more pluralistic, complex, and less easily controlled environment. The real challenge is that the rules of managing the conflict change without altering the rules of the conflict itself. The Middle East needs not only a new system to manage its crises but a system capable of addressing their sources.

Thus, the question posed by the phase is not: Is America in decline? But rather: Who will set the rules for the Middle East when no single party can set them alone? The answer to this specific question will determine the future of Palestine, the future of regional security, and perhaps the shape of the Middle Eastern system over the next decade.