Has interest in Hormuz declined?

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Weeks ago, the Strait of Hormuz was at the forefront as the center of the confrontation between the United States and Iran, and the most disturbing address in global energy markets. The question was whether Tehran was able to disrupt one of the most important oil arteries in the world, and whether Washington could reopen it by force.

Today, it seems that attention has gradually moved to other fronts, especially with the escalation of the Saudi-Houthi confrontation, attacks on airports and civilian facilities, and the possibilities of direct American intervention in Yemen.

But does this mean that the importance of Hormuz declined, or that attention turned away from him while the crisis remained?

In fact, what has changed is the order of interest, not the strategic weight of the strait. At the beginning of the confrontation, the closure of Hormuz or the disruption of navigation seemed to be a development capable of causing an immediate global economic shock.

Over time, markets, energy importing countries and shipping companies began to partially adapt to the new situation. Alternative routes were sought, transportation schedules were adjusted, and additional insurance and shipping costs were incurred. Thus, the crisis turned from a sudden shock into a costly reality that the various parties are trying to manage.

But adaptation does not mean solution. The continued transit of some ships, or the success of producing countries in using alternative pipelines and ports, does not mean the return of freedom of navigation. The ability of the United States to impose its military presence in the region does not necessarily mean its ability to guarantee the safe passage of every tanker. This is one of the basic paradoxes of the confrontation: American military superiority is clear, but converting this superiority into permanent commercial stability is a different matter.

On the other hand, Iran's calculations have also changed. It discovered that the continued threat to navigation could give it long-term negotiating leverage, without the need for a complete closure of the strait. The risks alone are enough to raise the cost of insurance and transportation, confuse markets, and keep pressure on energy-importing countries. However, this card has limits, as its excessive use may push countries that preferred neutrality to take more stringent positions towards Tehran.

What is new is that the escalation in Yemen has brought Bab al-Mandab firmly back into the calculations. Here we are no longer facing one strait, but rather two sea lanes that are affected by the movement of energy and global trade. The first is at the entrance to the Gulf, and the second is at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, which directly affects navigation through the Suez Canal. For Egypt, this interconnectedness makes the issue beyond a mere follow-up to a regional conflict.

It is a mistake to believe that the shift of media attention to the attacks on Saudi Arabia means a decline in Hormuz’s position in the American-Iranian negotiations, as the Strait is still one of the most important pressure cards, and any serious settlement will need to address navigation security, the blockade, and mutual guarantees, in addition to the nuclear file.

Hormuz has not lost his importance, but he has lost some of his ability to monopolize headlines. The cameras moved to Riyadh, Yemen, and Bab al-Mandab, while the Strait remained at the heart of the equation of war and negotiation.

Quoted from “Al-Masry Al-Youm”