"Hezbollah" and the Support of "The Flood of Defeat"

Listen to the article, the audio text is automatically generated by a system.

When "Hezbollah" decided on October 8, 2023, to open the southern front under the title "Supporting the Flood of Al-Aqsa," it wanted to present itself as a partner in creating what it considered a "historic transformation" in the conflict with Israel. That day, its leaders spoke about the unity of the arenas, about changing the rules of engagement, and about a battle that would outline the features of a new Middle East. But after three years, nothing remains of those promises except a heavy memory, while the slogans of victory have turned into the realities of defeat that Gaza and Lebanon have paid dearly for.

In politics as in wars, results are measured by the final outcome, not by speeches and slogans. The outcome today is clear. Gaza has suffered unprecedented destruction, and "Hamas" emerged from the war weaker than it was, while "Hezbollah" found itself facing a reality fundamentally different from what it had painted for its audience. Instead of establishing a new deterrence equation, it entered into a confrontation that revealed its military, security, and political weaknesses, and showed that many of the assumptions on which it built its strategy were no longer valid.

The "party" miscalculated its enemy, misjudged the regional and international environment, and most importantly, miscalculated Lebanon's ability to bear the consequences of a new war. It dealt with events with the mentality of a preordained victor, not with the mentality of someone weighing profits and losses. It assumed that Israel would remain constrained by old equations and that the southern front would provide Gaza with a wide strategic margin. However, what happened was that the war continued, the destruction widened, while the southern Lebanese villages turned into open arenas of losses, displacement, and destruction.

Ironically, the "party" that justified its intervention by claiming to protect Lebanon and deter threats has ended up dragging Lebanon toward one of the most dangerous phases in its modern history. Thousands of families have paid the price of displacement, entire towns have been devastated, and the already weakened Lebanese economy has received an additional blow, while the Lebanese people have not received any convincing explanation as to why it was necessary for them to bear the costs of a war that was not decided by the parliament, the government, or the Lebanese people.

The most dangerous thing is that the "party" did not stop at the mistake, but rather refused to acknowledge it. After all the losses, there has been no real review, nor has there been any serious discussion about the feasibility of the support decision or its results. It seems that the Lebanese are expected to pay the price in silence, while the decision-makers continue to repeat the same narrative that preceded the war.

Three years have passed since the "Support of the Al-Aqsa Flood", but the question that imposes itself today is: What was actually supported? Was Gaza supported, or was a new tragedy added to its tragedies? Was Lebanon supported, or was it pushed further into isolation and ruin? And did the "party" strengthen its position, or did it reveal the limits of its power and ability to impose its equations?

The reality is that what began under the title of "support" ended in a series of accumulated defeats. Gaza lost, Lebanon lost, and the "party" lost a large part of the image it had built over decades as a force that knows when to fight and when to refrain from fighting. The clearest result is that the decision presented as a historic strategic step will be recorded by many as one of the biggest political and military mistakes in the history of the "party".

On the third anniversary, the scene does not appear to be one of victory or achievement. It is a scene of a project that relied solely on power, ignored the facts, and believed that will alone is enough to change the balance of power. And when the dust of battles settled, nothing remained of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" for Lebanon except a flood of losses and questions that are still waiting for answers.

Quoted from "Nidaa Al-Watan"