INSS Survey in the West Bank: What Did the Institute Want to Say to Israel and the Palestinians?

Writer: Major General Ahmed Issa

The survey conducted by the Israeli National Security Studies Institute (INSS) does not only monitor the positions of Palestinians in the West Bank, but also aims to send a political and security message supported by the survey results to the Israeli decision-makers, which is:

The genocide in Gaza and the erasure war in the West Bank, as described by the Israeli B'Tselem organization, have contributed to a decline in Palestinian support for armed resistance and for Hamas's monopoly on governance in Gaza, and have opened a window for a political path; however, the continuation of the economic blockade, ongoing military operations, settler terrorism, and the absence of a political horizon may close this window and reproduce armed resistance.

The INSS conducted a telephone survey from June 27 to July 2, 2026, on a sample of 400 Palestinians in the West Bank, having previously conducted a similar survey in the West Bank in September 2025. The results of the latest survey, compared to the results of the first survey, show:

That Palestinian society in the West Bank is living under severe economic and security pressure; 97% of West Bank residents consider unemployment and loss of income a central problem that poses the primary threat to them, while 96% see settler terrorism as the second-ranking threat, followed by Israeli military operations at 91%, and 60% report that their sense of personal security is low or very low.

In the economic context, last year's survey only asked about the economic situation, where the results showed that 87% of respondents in the West Bank believe their economic situation has deteriorated since October 7.

The results also showed that 74% of West Bank residents fear that their cities will face destruction similar to that of Gaza, which is the same percentage recorded in 2025.

It is true that the percentage of those who are 'very worried' about this scenario has decreased from 55%, as it was last year, to 42% this year, but this does not mean the feeling of fear has vanished; rather, it has shifted from acute anxiety to ongoing concern.

The first message to Israel: fear (deterrence) has been achieved, but it has not resulted in acceptance of Israel.

INSS wants Israeli decision-makers to conclude that the Gaza war has affected Palestinian calculations, which is evident in the increase in the percentage of those preferring negotiations from 43% last year to 52% this year, while 13% chose unarmed popular resistance and 12% chose armed resistance. Additionally, the percentage of those agreeing that violent resistance has not yielded quick results, despite its high cost, has risen from 50% to 57%, leading them to believe that the priority should now shift to diplomatic efforts.

In the assessment of the Gaza war, 38% of those surveyed expect losses for both sides, while 27% see it ending without a clear victor, and only 9% expect a victory for either Israel or Hamas. This supports the narrative of the institute that the Israeli military power has achieved a tactical military victory, which has weakened the belief in the possibility of a Palestinian military victory.

However, the survey warns against confusing tactical achievement with strategic achievement; the results show that 41% of West Bank residents acknowledge Israel's right to exist, indicating an increase in the percentage of those recognizing the right to exist compared to last year, where the percentage was 38%, representing an increase of 3 percentage points. Notably, the percentage of those denying this right reached 46%, meaning they still constitute the majority, despite a decrease compared to last year, where it was 54%. Additionally, 42% believe that ending its existence is still possible. This means that the war has changed the assessment of the feasibility of means, but it has not settled the position on Israel or the legitimacy of its existence.

It is important to clarify here that the variable of religiosity, according to the analysis presented in both the Hebrew and English versions and not mentioned in the Arabic version, was the influencing variable in the issues of denial and recognition; the likelihood of religious respondents acknowledging Israel's right to exist is 22% lower compared to non-religious respondents with similar demographic characteristics. Age also played a role in this matter; the likelihood of recognizing Israel's right to exist increases by 8% for every 10-year increase in age.

The second message: There is a political opportunity without a ready Palestinian partner.

No solution enjoys a Palestinian majority; the results showed that 27% prefer two states, 26% prefer a Palestinian state over all of historic Palestine without a permanent Jewish presence, 22% prefer a bi-national state with equal rights, and 17% prefer a Palestinian state over all the land where Jews can live as citizens or residents.

46% believe that coexistence in an equal state is possible, while 50% see it as impossible. Additionally, 43% support expanding the Abraham Accords if it leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state, while 43% oppose it. This means that a base for settlement and regional integration exists, but it remains divided and lacks a unified vision for a final solution.

In contrast, the Palestinian system suffers from a crisis of leadership and representation; 44% say they would not vote in general elections if they were held, with Fatah expected to receive 30%, the 'Third Way' 11%, and Hamas only 4%. Furthermore, 44% do not specify a preferred successor to Mahmoud Abbas, while Marwan Barghouti leads with 34%.

The Israeli message here is that Hamas's retreat does not automatically lead to the restoration of the Palestinian Authority's legitimacy, and that any political path requires rebuilding a legitimate Palestinian partner, rather than merely maintaining a weak authority that performs security functions.

The third message: Hamas has weakened as a power, but the legitimacy of its weapon has not ended. Only 5% want the continued rule of Hamas over Gaza, compared to 32% who prefer a technocratic government or a national committee to manage Gaza, 21% for the Palestinian Authority, and 21% for a unity government between Fatah and Hamas.

40% support disarming Hamas, while 23% oppose it, but 37% do not specify a position. Among the supporters, only 18% believe that the movement will agree, while 22% think it will refuse.

Therefore, INSS is pushing for a technocratic administration for Gaza and distancing Hamas from power, but it simultaneously reveals that disarmament will not be achieved by administrative decision or military pressure alone; because the weapon is still viewed by part of the public as protection against Israel.

The fourth message: Israeli policies are reproducing extremism.

This is the most important message for the decision-maker. Statistical models have shown that considering military operations and settler violence as a severe threat is associated with a decrease in support for negotiations, recognition of Israel's right to exist, and belief in the possibility of coexistence.

An increase in the security friction index is also linked to a 31% higher likelihood of rejecting the disarmament of Hamas, while direct exposure to settler violence has led to a decline in preference for a bi-national state.

Thus, the institute clearly states to Israel: one cannot demand recognition of Israel's right to exist, coexistence, and disarmament while continuing the economic blockade, allowing settler violence, expanding military operations, and increasing settlement and erasure. These policies turn weapons into a tool that Palestinians believe they need for protection.

The message to the Palestinians

The results also reveal that the old Palestinian tools and leadership have reached a point of exhaustion. The decline in Palestinian support for armed resistance has not resulted in a unified diplomatic strategy, and the decline of Hamas has not led to the rise of Fatah, while Palestinian identity has strengthened from 39% as seen in last year's survey to 49% this year. Additionally, religious identity has decreased from 52% last year to 37% this year, while national identity has risen from 6% last year to 13% this year. The important point in this regard is that, to date, there is no political institution capable of transforming these shifts in identity definition into a national program.

This means that what is required from the Palestinian side is not a choice between a devastating war and fruitless negotiations, but rather building a strategy that combines resilience, popular protection, diplomacy, unity, and institutional reform.

Limits of the survey

There is no published evidence that INSS fabricated the results, but the sample is quota-based, the questions are sensitive, and the abstention rates are high, and some options were rephrased between the two surveys. Therefore, the results are suitable for tracking general trends, not for considering every numerical difference as a confirmed shift.

In conclusion, it can be said that the message that INSS wants to convey to Israel is that military pressure has created an opportunity, but it has not made peace. If military achievement is coupled with a political horizon, and it is added that it "leads to an independent Palestinian state as desired by the Palestinians," and settler violence is restrained, and a legitimate Palestinian leadership is rebuilt, diplomacy may be strengthened. However, if force becomes a permanent substitute for politics, it will produce a new generation of resistance, even if Hamas has significantly retreated.