Iran Needs to Reconcile Itself

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What Iran needs most during this critical period is to reconcile with itself. I mean here the ruling groups that are in conflict over decision-making, and it is impossible for the world to deal with them as a single voice! No mediator, no matter how skilled, can create a stable agreement with a party whose negotiator's authority is unclear, nor can they assure their partner that their signature will bind the rest of the power holders. I see this knot as the essence of the 'Iranian problem'!

Last week, the Iranian foreign minister spoke about Tehran's readiness to open the Strait of Hormuz within a week, through an initiative conveyed by mediators to Washington. Such news is encouraging, and superficially, those who oppose it bear the responsibility for the continuation of the crisis, but this is followed by impossible conditions.

The seven-day deadline is only for opening the strait, which is no longer completely closed. What about the nuclear file, ballistic missiles, and armed wings outside the borders? Negotiations may begin with partial arrangements, but it is a mistake to market it as a solution to the root of the conflict. If the conditions include protecting the military relationship with 'Hezbollah' and the Houthis, the question becomes more urgent: Is the goal to calm the region, or to ensure the continuation of the tools that contributed to igniting it?

The neighbors have a direct interest in knowing the answer. Lebanon and Yemen are two countries with their own interests, and they should not be reduced to Iranian negotiation papers. Any settlement that grants Tehran the right to determine the future of armed groups in them, behind the institutions of the two states, postpones and expands the problem. Iranians have the right to seek security, and their neighbors have the right to seek it as well. However, making Iran's security conditional on the vulnerability of others is a recipe for the perpetuation of conflict.

The memorandum of understanding mediated by Islamabad, signed by the Iranian and American presidents, was immediately followed by the targeting of a ship in the 'Hormuz'. What is the value of the commitment if an armed device has the ability to disable it? The signing is not tested in the meeting hall. Its real test begins when the instructions reach those who carry the weapon, and they are required to comply.

Another example of the contradictions is regarding the powers of the Iranian delegation to New York; there is talk of full authorization, followed by objections to negotiations and calls for accountability for the foreign minister. Announcing powers does not replace the clarity of the reference that grants and protects them. A negotiator who fears his opponents at home may spend more effort fortifying himself than bridging distances with the other party.

Mohammad Javad Zarif's book 'The Resilience of Diplomacy' was originally intended to be titled, as he mentioned in the introduction, 'Smiling Lips and a Bleeding Liver'! However, he retracted it for fear of being attacked. This book is useful for understanding this aspect of the internal conflict; the train of Iranian politics has 'no guaranteed seats' as the introduction states. Its author spent eight years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and presented his experience with the complexities of domestic politics and diplomatic work in Iran. The value of this testimony is that it comes from within the regime. However, in my opinion, it also calls for caution in interpreting every Iranian contradiction as a well-crafted negotiating tactic, as some analysts tell us. Sometimes we exaggerate the intelligence attributed to behavior that is explained by competition and the inability to reach an agreement.

I believe that part of the crisis is due to the way power is distributed. The multiplicity of institutions designed to protect the regime has become an obstacle, not governed by known rules, especially in the absence of a charismatic leader. In the face of multiple entities capable of objection, with ambiguity regarding responsibility for the outcomes, and the ability to disable any decision, the overlap of powers that was intended as a means of diversity to prevent the monopoly of power or threats to the regime from within has become a path to the weakness of the regime itself. It has become clear that what serves the survival of the ruling groups harms the state's ability to make decisions that the country needs.

The scene cannot be reduced to a diplomatic team seeking peace and a military team rejecting it. Within a single institution, interests and assessments may vary, and a person's position may change based on their location and calculations. Therefore, the phrase 'Tehran has decided' sometimes seems broader than reality. Which party decided? Who agreed? Who has the power to implement? These are practical questions for any mediator, not an academic luxury or an excuse to close the door to dialogue. We do not need to claim knowledge of what mediators say behind closed doors. It is enough to look at what they need to succeed in their mission: a party that can make a commitment and implement it. As for the neighbors, they cannot suspend their security and development while waiting for the end of an internal conflict in which they have no influence. Economic pressure may push decision-makers to settle their differences, or the opposite may occur; competition may intensify, accusations of negligence may be exchanged, and the cost may be passed on to the Iranian citizen. There is no guaranteed outcome of sanctions, nor is there a guarantee that time alone will rectify this imbalance.

What can be said is that the continuation of the crisis makes a settlement more necessary, but it does not automatically bring it closer. We are facing years of conflict, and the reconciliation required among Iranian factions is not near; it will go through an internal struggle for one group to prevail over the others. Agreement on a national interest does not exceed the weapon outside the general decision. This begins with the rulers' acknowledgment that the cost of their disputes is no longer an internal matter, as it has affected the interests of the region and the lives of its people. Only then will the Iranian know what his state wants, and his neighbor will know with whom he is negotiating. In conclusion: the persistence of any commitment being subject to internal revocation makes the political horizon narrow, no matter how many initiatives arise. The beginning is an Iranian agreement with Iran.

Quoted from "Asharq Al-Awsat"