So that the West Bank is not a card in the Israeli election fund

Writer: Fathi Kulaib

Israel sought to benefit from the international coalition that was formed in support of it after the “Al-Aqsa Flood.” It worked to impose new realities in the West Bank, by expanding the pace of settlement, increasing crimes and attacks, intensifying incursions, besieging cities and camps, expanding arrest campaigns, controlling land, and demolishing homes, in addition to many occupation practices that target the Palestinians, their land, and their existence.

The goal is clear, as expressed by more than one official in the Israeli fascist government, along with leaders of the settler militias, and it is to push the Palestinians, the owners of the land, to leave their lands and property, in preparation for taking control of them. That is, what is happening is not just a series of separate security measures, but rather an integrated path based on pressure on the Palestinian people of the land, and gradually pushing them to leave their areas. In a more clear sense, what is taking place is ethnic cleansing, described in its finest detail, and being implemented through multiple and gradual tools.

As for the international community's reaction, it was and still is timid, and was mostly limited to statements of condemnation and calls for restraint, without moving to practical political steps capable of stopping these practices. This meant, quite simply, that Western countries would not enter into a real confrontation with Israel for the sake of the Palestinians, and that the ceiling of Western pressure, no matter how intense, would remain limited, allowing Israel to continue the policy of imposing a fait accompli on the ground.

The Palestinians have, to a large extent, accepted this equation, and have continued to bet on Western intervention that can save the land and the people at the same time, and at the same time preserve what remains of the Oslo Accords and the chances of a political solution. However, accumulated experience has proven that this bet has become more difficult, in light of the continuation of settlement and the changing geographical and demographic facts on the ground, while the margin of possibility of reaching a viable political settlement is gradually declining.

Western countries have often considered that what is happening does not exceed the limits of “violence” and has not taken on a collective and organized character, even though the United Nations institutions have documented, on more than one occasion, that an important aspect of these practices are taking place in a systematic and planned manner, and that high levels of the Israeli security and military system are participating. Likewise, the killing, displacement, and siege of Palestinian cities, villages, and camps do not take place in isolation from the Israeli security and military institutions, but rather within the framework of continuous coordination, and under the direct or indirect supervision of officials and ministers in the Israeli government.

On the other hand, Israel seems to benefit from this international reality, because the absence of deterrent measures gives it sufficient time and space to turn every field measure into a new reality that is difficult to undo. Every settlement expansion, every confiscation of land, and every process of displacement or demolition practically means redrawing the Palestinian map and narrowing the space available for any future political solution.

It seems clear, from opinion polls in Israel, that the Likud Party and the coalition that leads the Israeli government may face difficulty in forming a new government if elections are held in light of the current circumstances. This increases the possibility of reopening the files brought against Netanyahu before the “judicial and political bodies,” and puts his political future before more complex possibilities.

Here the fear emerges of the possibility of Netanyahu resorting to the policy of “escape forward” and turning the tables on everyone’s heads, by undertaking an adventure in more than one direction, and transferring the internal Israeli conflict to new regional or Palestinian arenas. The more internal political and judicial pressures on him increase, the more likely the security and military files will be used to serve his political survival.

Although Netanyahu seeks to ignite more than one front at a time, with the aim of “impairing” the United States first, and trying to pull the Israeli voter toward an artificial or exaggerated external threat, it is clear that he has become shackled by a number of restrictions imposed by the American administration, especially at the level of managing the war in Gaza, and dealing with the fronts of Lebanon, Iran, and Syria. This limits, even partially, his ability to expand the regional confrontation in the way he wants.

However, the front that may be likely to flare up during the coming period, of course from one side, is the West Bank front, as it is the most influential front in the Israeli elections, for internal and electoral reasons related to the position of security and settlement in the accounts of the Israeli voter. Also, the differences between the American and Israeli positions towards the West Bank seem limited, which may give the Israeli government more room to move and impose new facts, without great fear of a decisive American reaction, at a time when the administration is also preoccupied with the American midterm elections.

In light of this, the Palestinian situation cannot remain in a state of waiting while Israel continues to draw, formulate and implement the strategies it wants, relying on the policy of imposing a fait accompli and on the factor of time as an element in its interest. Israel is constantly moving on the ground, while the Palestinian position often remains a prisoner of reactions and waiting for international positions.

The main question today is not only what Israel will do, but what can the Palestinians do in the face of this strategy? What are the political, national, legal and popular options capable of changing reality, or at least preventing Israel from turning its temporary measures into permanent realities?

The continuation of the Palestinian situation in a state of stability and helplessness is no longer a viable option, especially in light of the continuing national bleeding on more than one level, and at a time when Israel continues to draw, formulate and implement its strategies on the ground, taking advantage of time and the policy of imposing a fait accompli. What is required today is to seriously examine the options that the Palestinians have, and to activate what is possible of them, in a way that preserves our Palestinian people’s national rights, strengthens their steadfastness on their land, stops, at a minimum, the ongoing bleeding process, and prevents the West Bank, in particular, from being turned into a card in the Israeli election fund or into an open arena for settlement and displacement projects.

The Palestinian situation cannot remain in a state of waiting while Israel moves according to its political, security and electoral calculations, and continues to change the facts on the ground in a gradual and rapid manner. Hence, the minimum required is to formulate a clear political response from the leadership of the National Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, with factional and popular Palestinian support, that reflects the magnitude of the existing risks and establishes a more effective Palestinian movement.

This may constitute the beginning of the journey towards regaining the initiative, re-awakening the Palestinian situation, and moving from a position of reaction to a position of action and influence. The Palestinian initiative, if it has the political will and popular and factional cover, could open a new path that will return the issue to the forefront of Arab and international attention, and prevent the Palestinians from remaining prisoners of the facts imposed by Israel on the ground. It is certain that a clear and effective Palestinian position will be able to push towards more serious Arab and international positions, and may constitute a starting point for rebuilding a different political balance in the face of the policy of imposing a fait accompli.