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Personally, I think that what is happening in the Middle East was expected. I arrived at this estimate from following the path and cost of Iranian expansion, and I have written about it repeatedly. A state that spends its resources on establishing armed groups in its neighbourhood, and then bears the burdens of a project larger than its societies, creates the reasons for its failure. Every temporary success tempts decision-makers to take an additional step, until the distances and obligations become wider than they can bear, but they continue until they fall.

Tehran has spent billions of dollars in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. In other countries, it purchased weapons and loyalties, established financing and recruitment networks, and penetrated local institutions and economies. Its decision-maker believes that he is on his way to restoring the status of the Persian Empire. Mixing the project with a religious interpretation gives the authority a mandate that exceeds its limits and prevents it from being held accountable. In the discourse of ideological mobilization, the idea of ​​paving the way for the appearance of the Hidden Imam was present. Thus, fallible political decisions acquired religious immunity, and objection to them came to be interpreted as hostility to the sacred.

In Syria, the cost of this perception became clear. Years of spending and penetration ended with the fall of the ally on whom political and military investments were placed. The repeated justification was that the Syrian government requested assistance. It is as if the ruler’s approval gives him the right to mortgage his country, or gives the next person an open mandate to control its future. In the book “Subh al-Sham” by Hussein Amir Abdullahian, the protection of shrines (Maqam Zainab) is included in the narrative justifying the intervention. The reader deserves to ask how the mission of protecting a shrine expanded to include the affairs of an entire state and the destinies of its residents!

The loss of Syria affected the supply route to Hezbollah, and its Secretary-General acknowledged the scarcity of funding. Its basic leadership had suffered severe blows in the 2024 war, and then the next war came to add new exhaustion. This arrangement is important for understanding the accumulation of losses. The party's ability to replace weapons and cadres has declined, and the burdens of reconstruction and caring for families who have lost their homes and livelihoods have increased.

For the first time in a long time, the Lebanese state took an explicit position on the exclusivity of weapons, and banned the party’s military activity. Implementation faces major obstacles, and the party still maintains weapons, organization, and supporters. However, the question about the cost of his choices has become more urgent. Anyone who has been displaced twice, and has lost his home or job, has the right to ask who decided to go to war, and who will be responsible for extricating him from the tragedy. These questions reach his environment as well, no matter how much partisan rhetoric tries to contain them.

In Yemen we see another side of the problem. The Houthi advance on the coast tempted its owners to expand control around Bab al-Mandab, and increase their ability to threaten navigation and the neighborhood. The Yemeni government then announced a campaign to reclaim areas controlled by the group. Field reports, citing officials and witnesses, indicated that sites near the strait had been recovered. The battle continues. What deserves attention is the possibility of disparate Yemeni forces coming together to restore the state, after years in which the Houthis benefited from their differences.

In Iraq, the demand to limit weapons to the state is advancing, and factions linked to Tehran are resisting it. Declaring the desire to implement this demand is a weighty political step, and turning it into a reality requires ability, will, and internal settlement. I believe that the factions’ insistence on having an independent decision reveals the essence of the dispute: who decides war and peace, and who is held accountable for the use of force? Building the national state will necessarily narrow the space of influence that moves outside its institutions.

The speed of transformations varies between these arenas, and they bring together an increasing cost to the Iranian project. The money needed to maintain influence is running out, losses are beginning to swell, and societies that have endured wars are demanding a normal life. Iran itself has a people with its own needs and aspirations, and it may bear a heavy share of the bill for this expansion.

I think over-expansion explains an important aspect of the decline we are observing. The Levantine proverb says: “You only become younger when you grow older.” In the Gulf, we say: “If God wanted the ant to disappear, He would give it two wings.” Iran has more than two wings! Proverbs summarize people's experience of the corruption of the arrogance of power. The project owner believes that the expansion of his presence is evidence of the soundness of his calculations, so he doubles the adventure and underestimates the rejection that is accumulating around him. After the loss, he finds himself forced to defend positions in which he was talking about victories some time ago. What is worrying is that recognizing this transformation is difficult for those who made it. In a regime that links its legitimacy to a historical message and a sacred mission, the review becomes an accusation against the leadership and its narrative about itself. So the reckoning is postponed, and every loss is interpreted as a passing conspiracy. Resources continue to be consumed in search of restoring a situation whose conditions have changed.

It is the responsibility of Arab governments to invest in this opportunity. People need security, justice, education, job opportunities, and guarantees that citizenship includes everyone. The state's success in these functions takes away from armed groups reasons for recruitment and influence. In Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, there are societies exhausted by wars and in need of a partnership that respects their dignity. Any dealing with it in a spirit of revenge sets up a cycle of rivalries, and gives foreign intervention another opportunity to return under different names and slogans.

The landscape is changing, and the region's opportunity to build countries capable of protecting their citizens deserves serious work. The Iranian decision-maker must read what is happening and take into account the interest of his country and its people in a normal relationship with its neighbors.