Trump and the Ukrainian war

Since his 2024 presidential campaign, Trump has had his own unconventional stance on the Ukraine war. What is meant by unconventional is that the positions of the Western coalition countries were generally biased towards Ukraine. As for Trump, he spoke more than once that if he had remained in power after the end of his first presidential term, the war would not have broken out in the first place. There was a basis for what he said, because the Russian side took the decision to go to war after Western-backed Ukrainian procrastination in implementing the two 2015 Minsk agreements, under which Moscow accepted that the Donbass republics would remain under Ukrainian sovereignty in exchange for their enjoyment of autonomy. And also after Ukraine started. Relying on Western support, it is becoming more stringent in its demands, especially hints at its desire to restore its status as a state possessing nuclear weapons that it inherited from the Soviet era, and which it abandoned under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum in exchange for Russian, American, and British guarantees to respect its independence and sovereignty. When Trump won his second term, he translated his position toward the Ukrainian war into accepting the principle of Ukraine offering territorial concessions to Russia and not joining an alliance. «NATO». This position would have represented a boost to the settlement process, but that did not happen because it was difficult for Ukraine and its European allies to accept the proposed territorial concessions after nearly 3 years of war. It is also most likely that the security guarantees proposed for Ukraine, especially since it will not join NATO, were not acceptable to Russia. Thus, the settlement attempt that was based on Trump’s ideas did not lead to any result, and there was no radical change in the course of the Ukrainian war that would end the stalemate, meaning the inability to resolve and escalate.Which is required by both sides of the war trying to impose their will. The US-Russian agreement, on October 9, regarding Russian diesel supplies, opened a new page in Trump’s position towards the Ukrainian war. This was expected in any case, as the Russian behavior cooperating with Trump to alleviate the blow of the diesel supply crisis was not expected to go unnoticed, but Trump issued an executive order in which he suspended sanctions and customs duties imposed on Russia. For his part, the Ukrainian president strongly criticized the agreement, and considered it a reward for Moscow and an encouragement for it to continue its attacks against Ukraine, instead of pressuring it to end the war. As was expected, criticism of the agreement extended to the circles. European policy official Kaya Kallas warned that easing restrictions “provides Moscow with more revenues to finance its war.” These circumstances brought back the atmosphere of the stormy meeting between Trump and Zelensky in the White House, in February 2025, in which Trump and his deputy directed sharp criticism of Zelensky in an unprecedented manner, and he was asked to leave the White House early. This atmosphere was repeated after the recent crisis, albeit indirectly, as Trump stated that the time had come for Ukraine to get a new president who could conclude an agreement, and accused Zelensky of deliberately prolonging the war, and of being the direct cause of the rise in energy prices due to the Ukrainian strikes that targeted Russian oil refineries. In this charged climate, European fears arose again that the recent developments would lead to a reduction in arms supplies to Ukraine, or according to intelligence exchanges with it, all of whichDevelopments indicate that the path to settlement is still faltering.