Western media and the Houthis

Following the recent Houthi terrorist attacks on Saudi Arabia, especially the airport attacks, the majority of the Western media and the elites associated with them returned to talking about the limited military options before the Saudi-led Arab coalition, and the difficulty of achieving a decisive victory in Yemen. This coverage ignores an important fact, which is that Western pressures to restrict the coalition’s progress in 2018 under the pretext of a humanitarian catastrophe contributed to consolidating the group’s control over Sana’a, giving it time to develop its missile and drone capabilities to become a serious threat to the stability of the region, and today these same outlets are returning to talk about the difficulty of defeating it. In 2018, the balance of the battle was different, as the Yemeni government forces supported by the Saudi-led coalition approached Sana’a, and began a broad military operation to retake Hodeidah, the strategic port. On which large areas of Yemen depended to import food and fuel. According to a report published by the Washington Post in March of that year, government forces were approximately 60 miles from the capital. In June of the same year, coalition-backed forces advanced towards Hodeidah, in a development that threatened to decisively change the balance of control on the ground. But this advance faced huge Western pressure, which focused on warnings of a humanitarian catastrophe and possible famine if military operations continued in Hodeidah. On June 13, 2018, the Washington Post published an article warning of the humanitarian repercussions of the war. In November of the same year, Reuters reported that the coalition stopped its attack inside Hodeidah after increasing Western pressure to push for a ceasefire. The strategic outcome was clear:The battle was not completed in a way that changed control over the most important centers of Houthi power, and Sanaa remained under the group’s control, and its influence over Hodeidah and its port continued. On the other hand, Western pressure did not succeed in ending the war or imposing a settlement that would disarm the militias and return state institutions to the capital. Thus, humanitarian warnings turned from calls to protect civilians into a pressure factor that restricted the coalition’s military options, without being matched by a political path capable of ending Houthi control. Completing the military advance would have permanently changed the balance of power. Restoring Sanaa would have ended the Houthis’ control over the capital and state institutions and provided a national alternative and reliable hope for the Yemeni people. Restoring Hodeidah would have meant limiting their control over one of the most important supply and resource outlets. This would have given the Yemeni government and the coalition a stronger negotiating position, and opened the way to a settlement that would subject weapons to state authority and turn the Houthis into a political party operating within its institutions, instead of continuing as an independent military force imposing its will with weapons. In fact, it was not required to ignore humanitarian risks or cut off food and fuel from the Yemenis, but operations could have been carried out while securing ports, aid, and civilian supplies. It was possible to combine the protection of the population and the restoration of state institutions, instead of treating the two options as contradictory. As for halting progress without imposing a settlement that would end armed control, it kept the causes of the war in place, and left the Houthis room to consolidate their authority and reorganize their capabilities. Now, after years of war, the language of Western coverage has changed; After warning of the coalition’s advance for fear of humanitarian repercussions, it becameThe focus on the growing capabilities of the Houthis to harm Saudi Arabia and the difficulty of defeating them is the most prominent headline. Reports published by Reuters, the Associated Press, the Financial Times, and American newspapers in October 2026 revealed the development of the group’s arsenal, the role of Iranian support and other international parties, and the challenges facing Saudi defenses in the face of these militias, and these are facts. But the problem with the Western vision is that it documents the growing danger, and then deals with it as an inevitable fait accompli, without adequate accountability for the policies that restricted the options for resolution and left the group investing time, external support, and Yemeni divisions to strengthen its power. Thus, in this narrative, the Houthis become a force that is difficult to defeat, instead of being a terrorist armed group that must be subjected to accountability and its threat ended. The West, which warned of the consequences of defeating the Houthis on civilians, is now explaining why it is difficult to defeat them. I say again: Western countries alone do not bear responsibility for the faltering of the war, as divisions within the anti-Houthi camp, the weakness of the Yemeni government institutions and others, are all factors that contributed to the continuation of the crisis. But this does not negate the impact of Western pressures in restricting military operations, nor does it absolve the policies that demanded a halt to progress from the responsibility of not providing an alternative that would guarantee the end of the Houthis’ armed control. In the ongoing Middle East crises, regional developments show that the balance of power is not static, and that groups that appear well-established can lose their influence when military and political conditions change, as happened in Syria and is happening now in Sudan. But changing the Yemeni reality requires a clear project to restore the state with international supportBroadly, instead of simply placing the burden on Saudi Arabia, managing the conflict, or treating the Houthi control as a de facto authority or a force majeure that is difficult to defeat. In any case, the Western press is not required to adopt the Saudi narrative. The job of objective journalism is to investigate violations, document civilian suffering from conflicts, and test the claims of terrorist armed groups. This same standard must be applied to the Houthis, as a terrorist group that practices armed violence and targets civilian facilities and international navigation. Its attacks targeted airports and civilian facilities in Saudi Arabia, and the Houthi attacks resulted in the death and injury of hundreds of people over the years of the conflict. These are not marginal details in war coverage, but they are facts that relate directly to the security of civilians, the stability of the region, and the global economy. The group that uses missiles and drones against civilian targets, threatens commercial ships, and imposes its authority by force must be held accountable for its actions, not to reports praising its ability to withstand or the difficulty of defeating it, and analyzing the complexities of the war does not justify ignoring the victims of its attacks. In short, stability in Yemen is only achieved by restoring the state and ending the Houthis’ control over Sanaa and Hodeidah. We should not listen to Western approaches and solutions that have proven their failure in all crises in the region, as the people of Mecca are more knowledgeable about its people, and more capable of understanding the roots of its crises and formulating solutions that take into account its security and the interests of its people.