A lesson Israel has learned: Relying on deterrence alone does not protect its citizens

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Between October 2023 and October 2025, the Israeli campaign evolved from targeting Hamas' military and governmental infrastructure to a prolonged campaign of attrition based on field control and follow-up operations against what remained of the movement's capabilities. The ceasefire represented a shift in military doctrine. Instead of extensive and continuous maneuvers, the Israeli army began to focus on four interconnected principles: the first of which was advanced defense, to create a physical space separating hostile forces from Israeli towns. The second is to continuously maintain intelligence superiority to monitor emerging threats before they crystallize. The third is the freedom of operations to continue strikes or enter areas under the control of other parties when necessary. Fourth, preventive efforts to ensure that Hamas and other armed groups are unable to rebuild the military capabilities necessary to launch another large-scale attack.

Why was Hamas allowed to rebuild its capabilities? Israel no longer seeks merely to destroy Hamas through a decisive maneuver, nor does it seek to administer Gaza or bear responsibility for its civilian population. Rather, it seeks a sufficient degree of control over the physical and information infrastructure to prevent the emergence of a strategic military threat, while leaving civilian rule to Palestinian and European mechanisms. Therefore, the true measure of success is no longer the number of Hamas fighters killed or the extent of its magnificent structure destroyed, but rather the movement’s ability to function again as an integrated military organization capable of launching another major attack.

The Yellow Line is the physical embodiment of this concept. It was not designed to be an international border, but rather an operational line of control that provides surveillance, early warning, protection of Israeli border towns, and rapid response to emerging threats. The military logic of this line is based on distancing threats from Israel and extending the warning period available to it. Thus, the area on the Israeli side of the line, which constitutes 60% of Gaza's territory, was transformed from a temporary battlefield into an advanced security zone. It is characterized by a military presence, surveillance, intelligence gathering, engineering work, and rapid reaction capabilities, as well as the ability to carry out limited-scale military operations without immediately returning to the scale of maneuvers witnessed during the war.

On the other side of the line, a serious researcher at an American think tank based in Washington says: The main civilian space is located in Gaza, where most of the Palestinian population is concentrated, and where Palestinian and/or international mechanisms for Israel are supposed to assume governance. However, Israel may find itself forced from time to time to enter this space militarily to ensure security control. Here a paradox arises. International parties will continue to criticize Israel for maintaining its presence in Gaza and carrying out operations across the “yellow line,” but operations are necessary now to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its military capabilities, and the more successful it becomes, the greater the chances that Israel will eventually be able to reduce its field presence. As for why Hamas was allowed to rebuild its capabilities? Israel may conclude that advanced and permanent field control is indispensable.

There is no doubt that the October 7 attack radically reshaped long-standing Israeli thinking on these issues. Israel was seeking to manage the threat to Gaza, but now it is seeking to prevent it from posing a source of strategic military threats. Distance constitutes an element of security protection in itself, but strategic depth has its costs. The further the Israeli forces penetrated into Gaza, the greater the military burdens and risks on the soldiers and the higher the political, diplomatic and economic costs. Prolonging the Israeli military presence may lead to American political support for the existing security architecture.

In the opinion of the same researcher, Israel should start now planning for the possibility of redeployment in the future. Waiting until diplomatic and political pressures intensify will put it and its army in a reactionary position, while advance planning will enable them to identify security functions that reduce Israel's depth of field and the extent of preparation for such a scenario. Moreover, all parties must keep in mind that any future redeployment will be subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions, not a timetable. The conditions are: that Hamas will no longer possess the weapons systems or the organizational, logistical and leadership capabilities to launch a large-scale attack, that effective capabilities must be applied to disarm the Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement, that an alternative ruling authority must prove its ability to maintain internal order and prevent armed organizations from rebuilding their capabilities, that effective mechanisms be implemented to prevent the entry of weapons, hostile jihad and components necessary to rebuild the military infrastructure in Gaza, and that Israel maintain a sufficient degree of intelligence access that allows it to monitor rebuilding efforts. Military capabilities before they turn into an operational threat, and for international parties to prove that they have an actual ability to implement post-war arrangements, not just declare their readiness to do so, and for Israel to be confident in its ability to defend its border towns.

If these conditions cannot be met, Israel may conclude that continued forward military control remains necessary.

The coming year (October 2026 - October 2027) should be treated as a period of strategic evaluation and not merely a continuation of the existing deployment. But the most pressing question is: Do the security benefits provided by Israel's continued presence in Gaza outweigh what could be achieved through a smaller deployment based on the border perimeter? If evidence suggests that basic security functions can be maintained by controlling a smaller amount of territory, Israel should begin a gradual transition toward defending the border perimeter. Otherwise, maintaining a forward military presence remains the wisest option.

Israel learned a lesson at a high price from October 7, which is that it can no longer rely on deterrence alone, technological superiority, or fixed border defenses to protect its citizens.