"I terrorize the neighborhood"

Listen to the article. The audio text is automated, generated by an automated system

Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was the creator of Hezbollah's glory in Lebanon, and the weaver of the narrative that he succeeded in presenting to his Shiite environment over many years. This narrative was based on two pillars: a promise of achievement, matched by an achievement presented as evidence of the validity of the promise. The "party" presents itself as having military capabilities that deter Israel, and the party that provides protection and stability for the southerners.

For years, the Shiite community has treated this narrative as a complete truth that does not need discussion. Israel's withdrawal in 2000, then the withdrawal that followed the July 2006 war, and the subsequent increase in Hezbollah's control and influence inside Lebanon, contributed to strengthening this conviction about the image of the "party" as a deterrent and protector.

But this narrative was gradually shaken after the opening of the “Gaza Support War.” Israel's success in reaching and assassinating a number of the party's leaders began to leave an impact within the Shiite environment, even if it was limited at first. Questions began to expand about the extent of the security breach that it was able to achieve within the “party’s” organizational and military structure.

Nasrallah tried to contain this turmoil, by focusing in more than one speech on demanding leaders and members to abandon the use of cell phones. But this message was not an internal security measure, as Hezbollah has its own organizational channels that allow it to circulate such instructions away from the pulpit. Rather, it was an attempt by it to “patch” the Shiite environment’s trembling confidence in the narrative, by presenting a narrative that explains that the problem is not a widespread Israeli intelligence penetration of the “party’s” structure, but rather the negligence of some elements and leaders in security measures and their use of cell phones.

Until the two tragedies occurred that practically ended the narrative that Hezbollah had built for decades: the pager operation, and then the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah.

Then the question is no longer about a security error here or individual negligence there, and it is no longer possible to explain what happened as a mere vulnerability caused by the use of a cell phone. The scene that unfolded before the Shiite environment was much greater than the party’s ability to “patch” it.

Then came the “Iranian Support War,” which led to the return of the Israeli occupation of large parts of the south 26 years after its withdrawal, completely overthrowing Hezbollah’s narrative of strength, deterrence, and protection.

The fall of the narrative was not a single event, but rather a path that began with shaking, then turned into doubt, before reaching the moment of complete exposure with the pager and the assassination of Nasrallah, and later, the arrival of the Israeli army to the outskirts of the city of Nabatieh.

If the Shiite environment had long supported Hezbollah based on its conviction in its capabilities and its belief in its narrative, a large part of it today is no longer convinced of these capabilities, after the “party’s” narrative fell and it was unable to produce a new narrative.

However, support did not fall, because Hezbollah still has power and control on the ground, while the Lebanese state has not yet imposed its prestige and authority in the Shiite areas.

Thus, belonging moved from belief to reality. Hezbollah became, to a large extent, like the “toughest of the neighborhood” during the civil war, which the people of the neighborhood courted because it was the strongest and most dominant, but they were waiting for the moment to get rid of it.

The problem is no longer the Shiite environment's belief in Hezbollah's capabilities and options, as much as it is the absence of a state capable of liberating it from the grip of "the ugliest of the neighborhood."