Iran...a bundle of problems

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“What is the Iranian problem that concerns analysts and decision-makers?” This was the question that was recently asked to me during a brainstorming session that brought me together with a number of political commentators in London.

The short answer is that - depending on the angle of view of the observer - Iran lies in a set of complex problems. For some, like successive US administrations, the crux of the problem lies in the current Iranian regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. Every American president has always presented “addressing the Iranian nuclear file” as a top priority. During the era of President Barack Obama, this “problem” consumed nearly the entire four years that his Secretary of State, John Kerry, spent in office.

The United States was not alone in this context; British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw visited Tehran five times to “solve” what was called the “nuclear problem.” All German foreign ministers and most of their French counterparts did the same.

In another context, the “Iranian problem” was defined as “the export of terrorism,” with cases cited that included more than thirty countries - from Kuwait to Argentina, through Turkey, Switzerland, and many European Union countries. In addition to this is the financial, military and political support that Tehran provided to almost all Palestinian factions fighting Israel, not to mention armed organizations in Latin America.

Reference is also made to the establishment of “agents” in a number of countries, especially in post-Saddam Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and western Yemen, as another facet of the “Iranian problem,” with countless numbers of Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, and Yemenis being killed at the hands of the “Quds Force” and its local elements.

Surprisingly, the outside world rarely sees the “Iranian problem” from the perspective of what the Iranian regime has committed against the Iranian people over the course of more than four decades. This includes tens of thousands of executions, and many massacres against unarmed protesters and opponents, in addition to Iran leading the world in the number of political detainees. All of this is without mentioning the transformation of an economy that was fairly developed into something resembling a refuge for the poor controlled by an extremely wealthy minority.

All of the above may seem like a long list of tragedies, some of which may apply to other countries as well. Now: What is the essence of the “Iranian problem” then?

Without answering this question, no solution to the problems presented above will be possible. Although the concept of “first sin” does not exist in Iranian culture, I believe we can use it to describe what happened in 1979.

That year, a faction of clerics, in alliance with a spectrum of leftist groups and “Third World” advocates, seized power, transforming Iran from a normal nation-state into an instrument of an ideological hybrid, made up of a modified version of the Muslim Brotherhood’s literature, with misunderstood Marxist and Leninist-Maoist concepts.

The mistake the outside world made was to ignore that transformation and lack vision by continuing to assume that they were dealing with a normal nation-state with normal interests, aspirations and ambitions like any other state.

This illusion was facilitated by the fact that part of the structure of the Iranian state before 1979 remained in place and was used as a front for the new Khomeini regime. The bureaucracy functioned more or less as it had before, while there were enough qualified and educated figures in America and Europe to fulfill their roles as ministers, diplomats and trade negotiators.

This is what Chris Patten, the European Union’s foreign affairs spokesman at the time, expressed by saying: “When dealing with Tehran, we meet talented actors who master diplomatic and political terminology as well as anyone else. However, we later discover that they are merely hired servants, playing the role of diplomat or minister, while others hold the reins of real power.”

To further complicate matters, the forces that dealt with Iran gradually formed alliances, with parts of the prevailing bloc in the fragmented political structure inside Tehran.

For its part, Russia focused its attention on the “Leader’s House” and the person of the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in addition to sectors of the “Revolutionary Guard” under his control. On the other hand, China placed its bet on the faction led by Ali Akbar Rafsanjani and his partners in the business sector.

As for the United States, it established close ties with the so-called “reformists,” such as former Prime Minister Mir Hussein Mousavi, and later the group known as the “New York Boys,” which functioned as a local branch of the American Democratic Party.

On the other hand, the British - and to a lesser extent the French - identified Mohammad Khatami, and later Hassan Rouhani, as “the man with whom one can work and negotiate.”

Other countries interested in, or fearful of, Iran have reserved special areas of influence within the frameworks set by the major powers mentioned above. In each case, external players were keen to reap maximum benefits, with the least possible economic and political investment in Tehran's fragmented power structure, while at the same time ensuring that rival powers did not expand their influence.

For its part, Russia refused to sell weapons to the Revolutionary Guard, which it sells to other countries such as India and Turkey. As for China, it bought Iranian oil at huge discounts, without paying cash, to impose its own products on the Iranian market, while the European Union made bright promises by signing contracts that it never fulfilled. Thus, maintaining the status quo became the unstated priority for all parties. This means keeping Iran on the wrong train, which it boarded in 1979, instead of helping it get off at the first stop. Therefore, for Iran to contribute to solving any of the aforementioned problems, it is necessary for Moscow, Beijing, Washington, the European Union, and half a dozen smaller regional actors to play the same tune. However, their failure to do so for nearly half a century may mean that they could adapt to what President Bill Clinton described as Iran’s “containment policy.”

Today, Iran stands at a point where competing internal and external factions are balanced; It is unable to change the environment surrounding it, and at the same time it is unable to change itself to suit that environment. It cannot fight war effectively, nor is it able to pursue peace. The result is what is known in German chess as a "Zugesvang" (mutual siege position), which means being stuck in an unenviable position, where any move results in damage.

Quoted from "Asharq Al-Awsat"