Is Ethiopia on the brink of collapse?

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Ethiopia has entered a new and more dangerous phase of its ongoing political crisis. Fighting has reignited in Tigray, while the federal government continues to face armed rebellions in Amhara and Oromia. The most significant development came on September 20, when seven political and armed organizations announced the formation of the 'Ethiopian People's Power Alliance for Survival,' with the declared aim of overthrowing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government and establishing a transitional administration.

The alliance includes the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the Fano National Movement in Amhara, the Oromo Liberation Army, along with four organizations from the Somali, Afar, and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. The importance of the alliance lies not in the imminent prospect of overthrowing Abiy Ahmed, but in the fact that forces with different histories and goals have decided, for the first time, to unite against the federal government.

Fano fought alongside federal forces against the Tigray People's Liberation Front in the 2020-2022 war. Today, the two forces sit in a single alliance. The Oromo Liberation Army, on the other hand, belongs to a different political tradition, primarily based on the Oromo demands for autonomy and self-determination. Therefore, this alliance does not yet operate on a shared political project for governing Ethiopia. It is an alliance against the existing government.

To understand the current crisis, one must return to the system that emerged after the fall of the military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, dominated by the Tigray People's Liberation Front, established a system based on ethnic federalism, officially recognizing the political rights and a degree of autonomy for Ethiopia's various nationalities. While the system provided a degree of stability for decades, it simultaneously left deep-seated disputes over political influence, borders and contested areas, and the distribution of power between the center and the regions.

When Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, he seemed to offer a different path. He opened the political space, released prisoners, and sought reconciliation with Eritrea. He then dissolved the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front coalition and established the Prosperity Party, pushing for a stronger concept of Ethiopian national identity.

For Abiy Ahmed's supporters, the goal was to transcend ethnic divisions. For his opponents, the trend was towards greater concentration of power in Addis Ababa.

The dispute erupted in the Tigray War in 2020. The Pretoria Agreement in November 2022 ended the main fighting, but it did not resolve the disputes that led to the war. Relations then deteriorated again. Fano turned against the government, the Oromo Liberation Army's rebellion continued in Oromia, and fighting has now resumed in Tigray.

Ethiopia, then, is not facing a single rebellion. It is facing multiple conflicts, arising from different causes, but now converging in opposition to the federal government.

Here lies the fundamental problem of the new alliance. Its members agree on what they want to overthrow, but they do not agree on what will come after.

The Tigray People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army want to reduce central authority in favor of the regions. On the other hand, Fano relies on Amhara nationalism and has regional demands, including areas in western Tigray that the Tigray People's Liberation Front considers part of its territory. Any transitional administration will have to determine who controls these areas, who controls the armed forces, and how power is distributed. These are the issues that could separate coalition members from each other.

The problem is not in declaring the coalition. The problem lies in the management after the fall of the government.

The strength of the coalition cannot be measured by the number of organizations that have joined it or by the number of fighters each organization can mobilize. Its true strength lies in its geographical spread. The government faces armed opposition in more than one region at the same time, while the opposition now has political connections between forces present in different areas of the country.

However, geographical spread does not mean the existence of a unified military leadership. There is still no joint command that can be compared to a national army command. In contrast, the government remains in control of Addis Ababa and the main state institutions, retaining the Ethiopian National Defense Forces and significant capabilities in drones.

Therefore, the military issue is not just about who can reach the capital. The more important question is whether the government can maintain control of the country while fighting on multiple fronts, and whether the coalition can turn its geographical spread into sustained military and political pressure.

Here enters the army factor.. The cohesion of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces will be a key element in the course of the crisis. The long war imposes increasing human and financial costs, but the army's cohesion gives the government a significant ability to prevent the opposition from transforming its regional influence into national change.

The government still has a political path alongside the military one. The Ethiopian constitution has not abandoned the federal system, and theoretically, the relationship between the center and the regions, as well as security forces, disputed areas, and political representation, can be renegotiated.

However, this path also has a price. If the government makes sufficient concessions, some opposition parties may find it in their interest to negotiate instead of continuing the war. If the concessions are limited, the calculations of the armed parties may not change.

Thus, the fundamental problem may become the widening gap between the state's official control and its actual ability to manage parts of the country.

Addis Ababa may remain under government control, while vast areas outside the capital become more difficult to manage. In this case, the conflict is not merely a struggle for power at the center, but a crisis in the state's ability to exercise its authority over its entire territory.

Another development that cannot be ignored is that the United States has entered the current crisis with a different security relationship with Addis Ababa than that which existed during the previous Tigray War.

On August 19 and 20, a high-level Ethiopian military delegation held talks at the Pentagon with American officials, and the discussions concluded with an agreement to establish comprehensive strategic cooperation in the fields of defense and security, along with expanding institutional cooperation and strategic coordination between the two military institutions.

This agreement does not mean that the United States is committed to defending Abiy Ahmed's government, nor does it automatically imply supplying it with weapons. However, it means that Washington now has a broader security channel with Addis Ababa at a time when the internal crisis has begun anew.

The American stance on the new fighting came quickly. On September 23, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Ervin Massinga stated that the leadership of the Tigray People's Liberation Front made a bad decision by launching a wide attack, describing the return to war as a 'battle that cannot be won.' He also warned of the possibility of imposing additional sanctions on leaders pushing Ethiopia toward further fighting and called for African Union-mediated dialogue.

This message is important. Washington is not treating the resurgence of fighting as merely an Ethiopian military issue. At the same time, it is not declaring an open military bias toward the government. Its publicly stated position so far combines pressure on armed groups, a call for African dialogue, and the maintenance of the new security relationship with the Ethiopian state.

As the fighting expands, American diplomacy becomes more important. The United States now has a direct security relationship with Addis Ababa, while at the same time having leverage over the opposition parties. Utilizing this relationship before the conflict turns into a wider war will be much less costly than dealing with it after regional intervention becomes a reality.

This is also important for Egypt. The longer the fighting lasts, the greater the need for powers that have channels with the parties in conflict to work on preventing it from turning into a regional war.

The Ethiopian crisis is no longer entirely internal. The country's location in the Horn of Africa, its relations with Sudan and Eritrea, its connection to the Red Sea, and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam all make any internal escalation likely to spill over into other countries.

The European Union has taken a different stance; it resumed direct budget support for Ethiopia in April with more than 140 million euros, as part of support for reforms, development, and stability. On September 28, the EU announced the allocation of 61 million euros in humanitarian aid for Ethiopia in 2026, while expressing concern over the renewed fighting in the north and calling for de-escalation.

Eritrea is more connected to the military side. It fought alongside the Ethiopian government in the previous Tigray war, but relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa have deteriorated since then. Ethiopia accuses Eritrea of supporting opposition forces to Abiy Ahmed, while Eritrea denies this. The renewed fighting in Tigray brings this relationship back to the heart of the crisis.

As for Sudan, it is in a more complicated situation. It is engaged in an internal war, and its borders with Ethiopia could become a route for the movement of weapons, fighters, and political influence. Any extension of the Ethiopian war to the Sudanese borders will come at a time when Sudan is already suffering from a massive security and humanitarian crisis.

For Egypt, the issue is not about choosing between Abiy Ahmed or his opponents.

The problem is what happens if the conflict drags on and transforms from an internal political crisis to a regional crisis. Sudan is already at war. The Ethiopian-Eritrean relationship is tense. The Red Sea cannot bear a new security crisis. Any large movement of refugees, weapons, or armed groups across the borders will add a new element to these crises.

If the federal authority weakens significantly, the question will not only be political: who governs Ethiopia? There will also be a practical question regarding who guarantees the security and operation of the dam. Will control remain in the hands of the federal government? Will it transfer to a transitional authority? Will local authorities in Benishangul-Gumuz have greater influence over it?

There is no evidence that any opposition faction is planning to seize the dam. But the existence of this level of uncertainty about the future of Ethiopian authority is enough to make the dam part of security calculations.

Here, the concept of the nation-state enters the Egyptian stance. Egypt does not view the unity of the state as a position specific to Ethiopia, but rather as a principle that applies to the entire region. Cairo has maintained this position in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere, as the weakening of the central state and the opening of the door to multiple centers of power usually does not stop at the borders of the state where the conflict began.

For Egypt, the nation-state is not a political slogan, but rather part of its security calculations. Egypt cannot support the unity of Sudan, the unity of Libya, and the stability of Yemen, while considering the disintegration of Ethiopia an acceptable solution to its internal conflicts.

Therefore, the Egyptian interest does not stop at its position regarding Abiy Ahmed. Egypt needs a stable Ethiopia with which it can negotiate, regardless of the form of political arrangement that the conflict may lead to.

This position is consistent with Egyptian policy in Sudan, Libya, and Yemen. Egypt's security is linked to the existence of states capable of managing their territories and institutions, rather than supporting a specific individual in each country.

Egypt does not need to join any Ethiopian party. In fact, its alignment with a particular faction would give the Ethiopian government the opportunity to present the conflict as a confrontation with foreign intervention, instead of remaining an Ethiopian dispute that requires a political settlement.

The most beneficial course for Egypt is to maintain communication with Addis Ababa, and its channels with regional parties, and to support the African efforts led by the African Union, while utilizing its relations with Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to reduce the chances of the conflict escalating into a regional confrontation.

At the same time, the stability of Ethiopia remains a prerequisite for any serious understanding regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. A long-term agreement on the filling and operation of the dam cannot be expected with a government engaged in internal warfare and facing an armed challenge to its authority.

Quoted from Al-Masry Al-Youm