October 1973.. How Egypt Made the Surprise Crossing and Redrew the Map of War?

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The October 6 War (October 1973), corresponding to the 10th of Ramadan, was not a military moment separate from its context, but rather came after years of rebuilding the Egyptian armed forces, the War of Attrition, and training and planning to restore balance to the front after the June 1967 War.

Egyptian official documents and materials provide a comprehensive picture of the stages of preparation for the war, starting from reorganizing the armed forces and raising their efficiency, through planning for the crossing and strategic deception, culminating in the execution of Operation 'Badr' and storming the Suez Canal and seizing the fortifications of the Bar Lev Line.

After the June 1967 War, the Egyptian armed forces entered a phase of extensive rebuilding, coinciding with the War of Attrition that lasted from 1967 to 1970.

According to the General Authority for Information, the War of Attrition represented an important phase in retraining the forces and enhancing their combat efficiency, in addition to completing the air defense system and moving the 'missile wall' to advanced areas near the Suez Canal, and executing crossing operations to the eastern bank to test the capabilities of the forces and disrupt the Israeli forces.

The goal of that phase was not to engage in a comprehensive war, but rather to exhaust Israeli forces, prevent them from solidifying their occupation, rebuild Egyptian military capability, and restore confidence in the armed forces' ability to engage in a new confrontation.

As planning transitioned from the preparation phase to readiness for war, the Egyptian leadership devised crossing plans that matched the available capabilities and the nature of the Israeli fortifications east of the canal.

The General Authority for Information indicates that operational planning began early, and the plan was known at different stages by names including "High Minarets" and then "Badr," after the attack date was set for October 6, 1973. The essence of the plan was based on crossing the Suez Canal, breaching Israeli fortifications, and creating bridgeheads that would allow for the continuous flow of troops and equipment to the eastern bank.

The Ministry of Defense clarifies in its published documents on war management that planning was not limited to the crossing operation alone, but also included various stages of the war, managing operations from the beginning until the ceasefire, along with plans to deal with developments on the front during the battles.

Maintaining the secrecy of the attack's timing and nature was one of the essential elements in preparing for the October War.

The official Egyptian sources present a set of deception measures that preceded the war, aimed at portraying military movements as part of training or routine activities, which helped maintain the element of surprise until the operations began.

In parallel, engineering preparations were made for crossing the canal and dealing with the earthen barrier and Israeli fortifications, including the use of water pumps to open passages in the earthen barrier to allow the passage of troops and equipment, the establishment of bridges, and the operation of ferries.

Thus, the crossing was not a decision made at the moment, but rather the result of years of planning, training, and preparing the necessary forces and engineering means to execute the operation.

On October 6, 1973, the Egyptian military operations on the front began at 2 PM.

The General Authority for Information indicates that the airstrike and artillery preparation coincided with the start of the crossing operation, while infantry forces moved to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal to storm the Israeli fortifications.

The military data issued by the General Command of the Armed Forces documents the developments of the first hours of the war in a sequential manner.

The first military statement, issued on October 6, began by reporting the Israeli attack on Egyptian forces in the areas of Zaafarana and Sokhna in the Gulf of Suez, before subsequent statements recorded the developments of operations on the front.

Then, the statements transitioned from describing the initial confrontation to monitoring the airstrike, ground operations, and the crossing, culminating in the announcement of the success of Egyptian forces in storming the Suez Canal and seizing several Israeli strongpoints, raising the Egyptian flag on the eastern bank.

The crossing operation was the heart of the "Badr" plan. According to the General Authority for Information, Egyptian infantry forces stormed the Suez Canal using assault boats, while engineering units worked to open passages in the earthen barrier, establish bridges, and operate ferries, allowing for the continuous crossing of troops and equipment.

Simultaneously, Egyptian forces engaged in battles with Israeli forces located in the fortifications east of the canal, managing to seize several strongpoints.

In the data from the General Command documented by the General Authority for Information, the gradual development of the battle from the incursion and crossing to the establishment of Egyptian forces on the eastern bank and the repulsion of counterattacks appeared.

The battles did not stop in the early hours of October 6.

During the following days, ground and air operations continued, and attempts by Israeli forces to launch counterattacks against Egyptian forces east of the canal persisted, while Egyptian forces worked to reinforce their positions, establish crossings, and complete their designated tasks.

The General Authority for Information presents the timeline of operations during the days of the war, including the battles that took place on the front during the first half of October, and then the developments in fighting in the second half of the month.

Among the most notable battles documented by official sources are the battles of Al-Fardan and the Chinese Farm, along with aerial battles, including the Battle of Mansoura on October 14.

The war should not be reduced to just the moment of crossing; military operations extended to complex confrontations both east and west of the canal, reaching the battles that preceded the establishment of the ceasefire.

The city of Suez witnessed another aspect of the October battles when the operations reached an attempt by Israeli forces to advance towards the city.

Official sources document the participation of military forces and elements of popular resistance in repelling the attack, in the context of the battles that took place during the last days of the war.

Documents from the Ministry of Defense reveal that the war management did not stop at the crossing stage, but included dealing with subsequent developments, including the gap and the stages of fighting that ended with a ceasefire.

The story of October did not end with the conclusion of military operations; rather, the war opened a political and diplomatic path linked to the restoration of Egyptian land.

Official sources indicate that the discussions at Kilometer 101 came after the war, followed by disengagement agreements, culminating in the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the return of Egyptian sovereignty over it.

Navigation in the Suez Canal resumed in June 1975, while the recovery of Egyptian lands in Sinai was completed with the return of Taba to Egyptian sovereignty after a legal and diplomatic process that ended in 1989.

Thus, the impact of the October War extended from the battlefield to a long path that ended with the recovery of Egyptian land.

Official documents reveal that the October War was not an isolated military operation, but rather an integrated system that began with the rebuilding of the armed forces, then benefiting from the lessons of the War of Attrition, preparing operational plans, executing strategic deception, leading to the airstrike, artillery preparation, crossing, and storming the fortifications.

The Ministry of Defense maintains a special archive of October War documents, which includes documents on strategic planning and war management through its stages until the ceasefire, along with documents related to dealing with the gap, disengagement, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

The data from the General Command, preserved by the General Authority for Information, provides a daily picture of the operations and documents the transition of the war from attack and crossing to countering counterattacks and the battles that continued along the front.

Between planning and execution, the October 6 War encapsulates an Egyptian military experience that spanned years, culminating in the crossing of the Suez Canal and the breaching of Israeli fortifications, which then opened the way for a long path to reclaim Egyptian territory.

The October 6 War of 1973 began six years after the June 1967 War, during which the Egyptian armed forces underwent extensive rebuilding and a war of attrition that lasted until 1970.

In 1973, Egyptian-Syrian coordination regarding the war took place, and October 6 was agreed upon as the date to commence operations, with the confrontation beginning at noon with a simultaneous attack on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts.

Military documents and official data issued during the war remain among the most important sources that track how Egyptian forces transitioned from the preparation and planning phase to the actual execution of the crossing, and then to the management of the subsequent battles.