Palestinian factions and the crisis of legitimacy: when the gap with the people widens

Writer: Mustafa Ibrahim

The Al-Aqsa flood and the subsequent war of extermination on the Gaza Strip sparked profound transformations in Palestinian society, and revealed the widening gap between large sectors of the people and the Palestinian factions, whether those affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization or outside it. Anger is no longer limited to specific political positions or disagreement over specific decisions, but rather extends to deeper questions related to the nature of Palestinian representation, the legitimacy of the leadership, the factions’ responsibility for the national path, and the extent of their ability to achieve the goals for which they were established.

The Palestinian factions have lost, to varying degrees, a large part of their national, political and moral standing, and their popularity and struggle status have eroded due to the accumulation of failures, the continuation of division, the absence of review and accountability, and the inability to develop means of political and struggle action, commensurate with the transformations that Palestinian society and the world have witnessed over the past decades. The slogans raised by these factions, most notably the liberation of Palestine and the return of refugees, are no longer sufficient to maintain people’s confidence, in light of the widening gap between the declared goals and actual political practice.

But the issue is not related to the change of generations alone, nor to the decline in the popularity of factions as a result of the war and its repercussions, but rather to a change in the circumstances themselves, the way people think, and their view of the political forces that claim to represent them. Palestinian society has changed, its priorities and expectations have changed, and it has become more accountable to leaders and decisions, while the factions have not succeeded in absorbing these transformations or dealing with them with different tools.

In the past, the factions had a balance of trust and historical and militant standing that allowed them to pass decisions and positions without having to explain all their details or convince everyone of them. Segments of Palestinians were accepting difficult decisions based on their confidence in their leaders, their history, and their sacrifices, even when they did not understand all the calculations and considerations behind those decisions. Trust often shortened the time for persuasion and gave the leadership room to act.

Today, this equation has changed. Every decision now needs an explanation, every position needs justification, and every step opens the door to discussion and questioning. This is not necessarily evidence that people have become less committed or more difficult, but rather that they are no longer willing to give their trust merely to the name of the faction or its history, without seeing a convincing performance, feeling that they are partners in the decision, or seeing practical results of the policies that are taken in their name.

The deeper problem is that the factions have not yet understood the magnitude of this transformation. The more people's confidence in her decreased, the more difficult it was to convince them, and the more she was unable to convince them, the more confidence in her decreased. Thus, the relationship between the two parties entered a closed circle, from which it is difficult to get out through traditional discourse or by recalling struggle history alone.

In the past, it was possible to pass a decision within minutes based on trust and prestige, but today it may take a day or a week to explain it without the leadership being able to convince people of it. The problem is not necessarily the decision itself or the way it is presented, but rather the amount of trust remaining between the two parties. When trust is weak, even the correct decision becomes questionable, while leadership that enjoys people's trust can explain difficult decisions to them and ask them to bear exceptional burdens when circumstances require it.

In short, trust used to shorten the time for persuasion, but today persuasion has become a condition for restoring trust. This is a completely different equation, and the factions cannot deal with it using old tools and methods, or be satisfied with improving their media and political discourse, without a real change in their practices and relationship with society.

The crisis of confidence cannot be separated from the obsolescence of the factional model itself. The problem is not that the factions were founded decades ago, or that the new generations differ from the generations that engaged in national action in previous stages, but rather that a number of them did not succeed in transforming their historical experience and sacrifices into a renewed ability to learn and adapt. During the past three decades, the world, the region, and Palestinian society have witnessed tremendous political, social, and economic transformations, with which the nature of conflicts and the tools for political and struggle action have changed, while many factions remained captive to their traditional organizational structure, the same decision-making mechanisms, and a discourse that is no longer sufficient to answer the questions of the present and the future.

These factions also did not succeed in conducting serious reviews of their experiences, drawing lessons from their failures, or developing means and methods of struggle and politics that are compatible with the changes. Over time, its struggle has eroded, and previous sacrifices are no longer a guarantee of its continued popularity or legitimacy. National history, no matter how rich it is in sacrifices and achievements, does not grant its owners a permanent mandate, nor does it exempt them from the responsibility of reviewing their choices and bearing the consequences of their decisions.

This crisis goes beyond individual factions to affect the entire Palestinian political system, with the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority at its heart. The Liberation Organization was established as a comprehensive national framework to represent the Palestinian people and lead their struggle for liberation, self-determination, and the return of refugees. But the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the context of the Oslo Accords, then the continued division and disruption of the renewal of representative institutions, created a political reality in which the functions of national representation overlapped with the functions of governance, administration, and security, without the elements of sovereignty being available or the occupation ending.

Over time, the relationship between the PLO and the Palestinian Authority began to raise fundamental questions regarding the nature of the national project and its priorities. Is the organization still performing its role as a national liberation movement and a unifying framework for Palestinians wherever they are, or have its functions and institutions declined in favor of a political structure centered around managing the authority in the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967? Do the factions still view power as a tool to serve the national project, or has preserving institutions, positions, and influence become part of their political and organizational calculations?

This does not mean that managing the affairs of the Palestinians necessarily conflicts with the struggle for liberation. Rather, the problem begins when the requirements of managing an authority with limited powers under occupation override the goals of national liberation, or when preserving the existing political structure turns into an end in itself, instead of being a means to serve the people and achieve their rights.

When political forces are preoccupied with managing division and distributing influence and positions, and their ability to renew national representation and develop a joint strategy to confront the occupation declines, the gap between them and society becomes wider.

The legitimacy crisis is also deepened by the absence of regular elections, the disruption of representative institutions, the continued monopoly of decision-making, and the absence of political accountability. Legitimacy is not just a characteristic that leadership derives from the date of its founding or external recognition, but is also linked to its ability to represent people, respond to their aspirations, involve them in crucial decisions, and be accountable for the results. Without this, historical legitimacy becomes a contradictory asset that cannot be compensated for simply repeating national slogans or demanding a rally around the leadership.

The war of extermination on the Gaza Strip, with its unprecedented destruction, human losses, displacement, and suffering, has revealed the extent of the crisis that the Palestinian national movement is experiencing, and the inability of the political system to provide convincing answers regarding the management of the disaster, the future of the Strip, reconstruction, the unity of institutions and national decision-making, and the form of the relationship with the occupation. This crisis cannot be reduced to factional disputes or the repercussions of war alone, because it is also linked to the absence of a comprehensive national project, and the inability of political forces to build a new relationship with society based on trust, participation, and accountability.

Getting out of this crisis does not begin with exchanging accusations, nor with simply changing some leaders or improving the media discourse, but rather with a comprehensive review of the nature of the national project, its tools and institutions. A review that acknowledges failures and mistakes, redefines the relationship between the factions and society, and opens the way for renewing the PLO on democratic and participatory foundations, ending the division, rebuilding representative institutions, and ensuring the Palestinians’ right to choose who represents them and hold them accountable.

The most important thing is for the factions to realize that restoring confidence is not achieved by demanding it, nor by recalling their history and sacrifices whenever they are subjected to criticism, but rather by proving their ability to learn and change, and by acknowledging that their legitimacy does not belong to them, but rather derives it from the people they claim to represent, and from their ability to serve their goals and national rights.

The Palestinian crisis today is not only a crisis of factions that have lost part of their popularity, but rather a crisis of a political and militant model that is no longer able to absorb the transformations that have occurred in society, nor to renew its legitimacy and tools.

The question facing the Palestinians is not how to restore confidence in the factions as it was in the past, but rather how to build a renewed national movement that regains people’s confidence, restores respect to participation and accountability, and links the management of Palestinian affairs with the national liberation project.

A national liberation movement cannot continue to rely on the legitimacy of the past alone, nor can a political regime claim to represent its people indefinitely without a renewed mandate. Between the legitimacy of history and the legitimacy of the present, the Palestinian national movement stands before an entitlement that cannot be postponed: either it must review itself and rebuild its relationship with the people on new foundations, or it will continue to retreat while the gap widens between it and the society that it originally arose to liberate and represent.