Security Gaps and Questions About Allowing an Omani Co-Pilot to Work on a Flydubai Flight to Israel

Tel Aviv - Afaq News - New details regarding the Omani co-pilot Hamam Al-Hamami, who is suspected of attempting to take control of a Flydubai aircraft and crash it, have raised a series of questions about the gaps that allowed him to operate on the flight heading to Israel, despite the absence of official diplomatic relations between Israel and the Sultanate of Oman, and despite reports indicating that he had previously been suspended from work due to what was described as religious-jihadist extremism.

The aircraft ultimately landed safely, but new details regarding the co-pilot's background and the procedures that preceded his assignment to the flight have raised questions in Israel about the responsibility for security screening procedures, the entities that were supposed to handle the information available about him, and who will investigate these gaps.

How was an Omani co-pilot allowed to reach Israel?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acknowledged in an interview with Fox News the existence of a "gap" exploited by the Omani co-pilot, which consists of allowing a citizen from a country that does not maintain official diplomatic relations with Israel to pilot a plane to it.

At the beginning of the investigation, the Israeli Ministry of Transportation raised the possibility that the co-pilot might hold another nationality, which could explain how he was included on a flight to Israel, but this possibility turned out to be incorrect, and according to reports, Al-Hamami does not hold an additional nationality.

What did Israel know about his background?

According to ABC News, Oman Air suspended Al-Hammami in 2024 after he underwent what the network described as religious-jihadist extremism, and he was found in possession of "extremist materials," which led to his transfer to an administrative position.

The Saudi network Al-Arabiya also reported that Al-Hammami underwent this extremism during his time in Syria, noting that he spent most of his time outside the Sultanate of Oman, particularly in Syria.

In the same context, The Wall Street Journal mentioned that it was unclear whether this information was communicated to FlyDubai before they contracted him earlier this year.

Royal Air Maroc announced that Al-Hammami underwent three months of training with them, but he was not accepted for employment, making it the second airline to refuse to hire him after Oman Air, before he later joined FlyDubai.

Warnings regarding the security of flights coming from the UAE

Investigations also addressed warnings issued by the head of the Israeli Security Agency "Shabak", David Zini, regarding the level of security on flights coming from the UAE.

According to the report, Zini warned in recent months that the security measures on flights coming from the UAE do not provide, in his view, the required level of protection. A dispute also arose in the weeks leading up to the incident between "Shabak" and Israeli airlines after the agency prevented Israeli companies from operating flights to the UAE for security reasons.

The report indicated that Zini's warnings were primarily related to Israeli flights, for which "Shabak" is responsible for security, while "Fly Dubai" is a foreign airline and is not subject to the same direct oversight by the agency.

According to sources cited in the report, the concerns raised by "Shabak" included the level of security on flights coming from the UAE to Israel, with the possibility that security measures on foreign flights are less stringent. The report suggested that tightening security measures could have prevented an incident of this kind, noting that Zini did not call for a halt to flights coming from the UAE.

Is there a mechanism for checking the backgrounds of foreign pilots?

The report raised questions about the lack of a clear mechanism to deal with security information related to foreign aircraft crew members.

The Knesset had approved a law in 2023 requiring airlines to transfer all passenger and crew member data to Israel, as part of the visa exemption arrangements with the United States.

According to the report, this data is transferred to the tax authority to maintain privacy, while Israeli security agencies, including the Mossad, the Shin Bet, and the police, insisted on accessing the information for counter-terrorism purposes. The report pointed out that the question raised is whether this data, which includes crew members, has been used appropriately in the case of the Omani co-pilot.

What data do airlines transfer to Israel?

Airlines are required, according to the report, to provide advance data to Israel about passengers and crew members through the National Passenger Data Diagnosis Center, which is affiliated with the Tax Authority.

The data related to crew members includes identification information, nationality, and travel documents. Additionally, the information in the center is not only available to the Tax Authority, but various government entities can access it according to the powers defined by law, including the Ministry of Transportation, the "Shabak", the "Mossad", and the police.

The Ministry of Transportation confirmed, according to the report, that it is not the responsible entity for conducting intelligence checks on the security backgrounds of foreign pilots, nor does it possess the intelligence tools available to security agencies.

However, the report indicated that the ministry's security department is responsible for the field of aviation security, and among its tasks is the "security diagnosis of foreign flights transiting or arriving in Israel". It also operates an aviation security operations center that coordinates the security aspects related to the arrival of aircraft in Israel.

According to the report, a distinction should be made between the intelligence check of a person's background, which falls under the jurisdiction of security agencies, and the security diagnosis of the foreign flight. Therefore, the report raises the question of which entity was supposed to use the data available in the systems, including the identity and nationality of the co-pilot, to determine whether he meets the relevant conditions for traveling to Israel.

Who will investigate the gaps?

If it turns out that the information regarding the pilot was available to the Israeli authorities, but the relevant parties did not discover the problem in a timely manner, the investigation will need to identify the point at which the failure occurred, whether that was in the operating company, in the transfer of information, in the inspection procedures, or in the coordination between different entities.

The report sees that the investigation in this case should not be limited to the behavior of the airline, but should also include the instructions and procedures followed in Israel, and how different entities handle the information that reaches them.

The State Comptroller's report raises questions of responsibility

The incident has brought back to the forefront a previous report by Israeli State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman, published in May 2024, which addressed the security of international civil aviation to and from Israel.

The audit was conducted between April 2022 and June 2023, and included flights departing from Ben Gurion Airport, Israeli aviation security abroad, as well as the security of foreign and private civil aircraft entering Israeli airspace. The audit included, among other entities, the "Shabak", the Ministry of Transportation, the Airports Authority, and the Israeli National Security Council, while a large part of the findings remained classified for state security reasons.

The state auditor recommended joint work between the National Security Council, the Ministry of Transportation, the Ministry of Finance, the Airports Authority, the "Shabak", and the police, to examine international aviation security in Israel in various aspects, including foreign flights arriving in the country.

He also called for a reorganization of responsibilities and allocation of resources to ensure a "comprehensive vision", and requested that the Prime Minister, the Minister of Transportation, and the Minister of Finance formulate a comprehensive policy in the field of aviation security.

The report noted that the state auditor's report did not publicly address the security of flights coming from the UAE specifically, and did not include a judgment regarding the failure that appeared in the current incident, but its recommendations regarding the distribution of responsibilities gained new importance in light of questions about which entity was supposed to detect the "gap".

In this context, Knesset members, including Avert Reiten, Ram Ben Barak, Hili Trooper, and Ofer Forer, the head of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, called for an urgent session with the participation of the head of the "Shabak", against the backdrop of reports that spoke of early warnings regarding security issues in flights coming from the UAE.

Members of the Knesset indicated in their request that the actions of the passengers and crew prevented a serious incident from occurring, and they called for an examination of the aviation security system and the procedures that preceded the incident.