The decline of secularism in Israel: Why are the center and left parties abandoning one of their historical battles?

author

Mustafa Ibrahim

The Shas movement’s election propaganda, which warns against the establishment of a “state of all Gentiles,” reveals part of the ongoing conflict within Israeli society regarding the identity of the occupying state and the nature of the relationship between religion and politics. But the most important issue, as some analysts raise it, is not the content of this propaganda alone, but rather the absence of a clear political response from the centrist parties and what remains of the Zionist left, for which secularism in previous stages was an essential part of its identity and electoral programs.

The comparison between the campaigns of Meretz led by Shulamit Aloni in the 1990s, the “Shinui” party led by Yosef Tommy Lapid at the turn of the millennium, and the discourse of the Zionist center and left parties today indicates a shift worth considering. Previously, issues of religious coercion, public transportation on Saturdays, civil marriage, education, and exemptions granted to the Haredim were presented as central political and social issues. Today, it seems that these issues have regressed to a secondary position, despite the continuing disputes over them and the expanding influence of religious parties in public institutions.

In the 1992 elections, Meretz raised the slogan of separation of religion and state, and presented itself as a political force defending individual freedoms and the right of secular Israelis to choose their lifestyle away from the interference of religious institutions. In the elections of 1999 and 2003, the Shinui Party succeeded in exploiting the objection to religious coercion, and presented itself as a secular alternative to the Shas movement, taking advantage of the disputes over the financing of religious institutes, exemption from military service, and equality in bearing economic and social burdens.

But these experiences raise a question about the reasons for the decline of this discourse today. Have the priorities of the Israeli voter changed? Or have the center and left parties become more cautious in raising issues that might spark a confrontation with religious parties? Or have successive aggressive wars, the rise of nationalist and security discourse, and the transformations witnessed by Israeli society rearranged the issues on which parties compete?

Shas propaganda clips present secularism and multiculturalism as a threat to the Jewish character of the state. Its basic message is based on a sharp dualism: either a Jewish state, or a state that loses its identity and becomes “like the states of all Gentiles.” The matter here is not limited to defending religious practices or Jewish traditions, but rather it is related to employing religious identity in political competition, and portraying opponents as a threat to the state’s identity.

From this angle, the absence of a clear response from the center and left parties becomes a political issue, because it leaves the field open for the religious parties to determine the framework and conditions of the discussion, without the opposition confronting them with a clear project regarding the relationship between religion and the state, individual freedoms, and equality in rights and duties.

However, a distinction must be made between election propaganda and the positions of various segments of Israeli society. The clips produced by Shas do not alone prove that Israeli society as a whole is moving towards greater religiosity, but they reveal the way in which the movement is trying to mobilize its audience and exploit fears related to Jewish identity. On the other hand, the decline in secular discourse cannot be understood without looking at the political and social transformations that strengthened the position of the national-religious right and deepened its alliance with Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu.

This alliance is no longer just an electoral understanding between parties with different references, but rather has become an extended political partnership in forming governments and managing the state. Throughout the years of his rule, Netanyahu relied on the Haredi parties as a primary partner in his coalitions, while Likud moved towards greater rapprochement with religious and nationalist discourse. This convergence appears in Netanyahu's political discourse and in the nature of the alliances he has established, although determining the extent of the shift in Likud's positions and programs requires examining its positions and policies at different stages.

The issue here is not related to religiosity alone, but rather the intersection between religion, nationalism, and politics, and how this intersection is used to reshape state institutions. The rise of the national religious right gave religious parties an influential position in determining the government’s priorities and policies, while the ability of the center and left parties to make the issues of secularism, personal freedoms, and equality in bearing burdens an independent focus of political competition declined.

Here the issue of the change camp arises, which was formed in the context of widespread protests against what the Netanyahu government called “judicial reform.” This camp brought together political and social forces that differed in their positions, but they agreed to oppose the government’s plan to weaken judicial restrictions on the executive authority. However, this meeting does not necessarily mean the existence of a joint project to reconsider the overall transformations that the country witnessed during the years of Netanyahu and the right-wing rule.

The question here is: Was the Change Camp formed with the aim of changing what the Netanyahu and right-wing governments had done to the nature of the state and its institutions, or was its primary goal to change Netanyahu and his government?

In fact, the differences within this camp raise serious questions about the limits of its political project. Objecting to judicial amendments does not necessarily mean agreeing on a broader project to restore the independence of institutions, or reviewing the policies that strengthened the influence of the right in the judiciary, the academy, and the media, or confronting the transformations that affected the relationship between religion and the state. Defending the independence of the judiciary does not necessarily mean adopting an integrated secular program, or committing to bringing about a fundamental change in the policies established by Netanyahu’s governments.

Hence, it can be said that the change camp faces a question that goes beyond the identity of the next prime minister: Does it want to change Netanyahu while maintaining essential parts of the political structure and alliances on which it relied, or does it seek a broader review of the path the country took under right-wing governments? The answer cannot be decided through electoral discourse alone, but the parties’ positions and programs regarding the judiciary, religion, the state, and individual freedoms constitute basic indicators for determining the nature and limits of this project.

This issue gains additional importance in light of the presence of Avigdor Lieberman and his secular discourse within the right-wing camp. Lieberman does not propose an alternative to the right from the position of the left, but rather combines nationalist and security positions on the one hand, and secular demands related to the relationship between religion and the state on the other hand. This reveals that objecting to the influence of religious parties does not necessarily mean adopting the positions of the center and left on political and security issues, and that secular demands can find an audience outside the camp that has historically been associated with them.

Here the importance of distinguishing between secularism as a social position on religion and secularism as an integrated political project emerges. The voter may oppose the exemptions granted to the Haredim or the interference of religious institutions in the affairs of daily life, without voting for the center and left parties. He may vote for a right-wing party that adopts secular positions on some issues, but he adheres to nationalist and security positions that do not differ fundamentally from the positions of other right-wing parties.

Therefore, the decline of secular discourse among the center and left parties does not necessarily mean the disappearance of secular demands from Israeli society, but rather it may also reflect the inability of these parties to transform those demands into a political program capable of bringing together different social segments around a clear project. It may also be linked to prioritizing security and political issues over others in light of ongoing wars and conflicts, or to trying to avoid confrontation with religious parties for fear of their impact on the chances of forming a government. These are still explanations that need to be tested through programmes, positions and opinion polls, and not treated as settled reasons.

It is not enough, then, to say that secularism has declined in Israel based on its weak presence in election campaigns alone. The issue also relates to the extent of the opposition parties’ readiness to confront the transformations that have strengthened the influence of the religious and nationalist right, and their ability to present an alternative that goes beyond changing the prime minister to discussing the nature of the state, its institutions, and the rights it guarantees to its citizens.

The historical comparison with Meretz and Shinui re-raises a fundamental question: Why do the center and left parties no longer deal with religious and personal freedom, equality in shouldering burdens, and the relationship between religion and the state, as part of a clear political project, as they did in previous stages?

The answer to this question is not only related to the decline of an electoral slogan or the disappearance of an issue from party platforms, but rather to the limits of the project presented by the camp for change itself. If his goal is limited to changing Netanyahu, the transformations that his governments and coalitions contributed to establishing may remain outside the scope of review. But if he seeks a broader change in the nature of governance and state policies, this requires clear positions on the influence of religious parties, the independence of institutions, individual freedoms, and equality in rights and duties.