Washington and Tehran Seek an Agreement that Ensures Victory for Both
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The diplomatic and political movement that took place at the United Nations headquarters in New York, on the sidelines of the General Assembly, could not divert attention from the state of escalation in the West Asia region and the possibility of a return to the option of war between the United States and Iran. Despite the success of Qatari efforts in paving the way for Washington and Tehran to return to the negotiating table and hold a new round of talks, and what President Donald Trump’s statements suggested, describing the negotiations as constructive and positive, indicating the possibility of reaching new understandings that would reactivate the political and diplomatic track, this positivity, confirmed by Trump’s assertion that he is working to end the war with Iran as quickly as possible, along with the seven new points that Tehran presented to the American negotiator through the Qatari mediator, did not turn into a supportive factor in lowering the military ceilings and the high threats from both sides, whether from Trump, who threatened to wipe out Iran, or Tehran, which hinted at the possibility of launching a preemptive war if it felt serious intentions from Washington to initiate a new round against it.
The ambiguity surrounding the New York negotiation round, the American president's swift rejection of the Iranian points, and Iran's refusal to adopt his words as a final response to its initiative, while waiting for an official response through the Qatari mediator, makes it difficult to say that the indicators of agreement are stronger than those of disagreement. In fact, the lack of agreement still seems more likely than agreement.
The advancement of negative indicators means that the groundwork for reaching an understanding and its terms has not yet crystallized, and matters still need more time to mature such an understanding. If the factor of time is playing against Iran's interests during this phase, where the negative impacts of economic sanctions are escalating, compounded by the air blockade, it seems that the American president is aware of the negative economic impact of any confrontation with Iran, about a month before the midterm elections. However, on the other hand, he does not want to enter into any agreement with it. The agreement he seeks should ensure a complete return of security to trade routes and energy transfer, help in quickly lowering global energy prices, and restore fuel prices in America to their normal state before the crisis.
If the initial goals of the American president involve reopening the Strait of Hormuz unconditionally and restoring security in the waterways of the region, namely the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, achieving these goals will not provide Trump with the victory he aspires to, especially if reaching them involves reviving the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding, which was confirmed and requested by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his recent visit to Washington, given the significant political cost that Trump and the Republicans will incur on the eve of the elections.
From here, the return to discussing the nuclear file in the positions of the American president and his team, without any reference to the terms of the Iranian initiative, or even the signals that have come from their negotiating team, indicating some flexibility in applying these terms, is a sign of the true stance of this administration towards Iran and the mechanism it uses to manage the conflict with it. The price that the American president wants as an entry point for any settlement step with Iran, whether through reviving the Islamabad track or adopting the new Iranian initiative, passes through a single gateway, which is the nuclear file. In other words, Trump wants a prior achievement in the nuclear file, which would serve as a political and strategic victory for him.
On the other hand, Tehran, which does not trust Trump at all and believes that he is willing to violate any agreement after the midterm election challenges, whether it is a nuclear agreement or a revival of the Islamabad track, has thus sought from the beginning to make any progress in the nuclear file a step towards rebuilding trust and evidence of its seriousness in adhering to any agreement it makes with Washington. In the end, it would not have given Trump a free victory that he could use in the elections, while ensuring the implementation of what had previously been agreed upon.
Tehran, which monitors and tracks American military movements in the region, does not deal with American leaks about the decline in Washington's weapon stocks with much certainty and seriousness, especially in light of intelligence reports about the transfer of large quantities of strategic munitions to many bases in the West Asia region, particularly those close to Iran. Therefore, it deals with any political or military developments with great caution, announcing its readiness for a different response than before in the face of any aggression it may face again, and the possibility of a military option increases if the Republicans manage to win the elections, which would give Trump greater freedom to escalate and return to the option of war.
The door that Iranian President Masoud Bezhakian opened when he announced his country's readiness to negotiate the fate of its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent, within any mechanism agreed upon with Washington, was not a proposal aimed at procrastination, but rather a strategy through which Tehran seeks to play into Trump's ambitions for a nuclear achievement and to remove a pressure point from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's hands, who will try to use the nuclear file to tilt the balance towards war over the option of understanding. Tehran believes that any understanding with Trump will enhance his internal and electoral position, but it will not be in Netanyahu's interest, and it will put him in a difficult challenge that could significantly negatively affect his electoral battle, possibly pushing him to obstruct any attempts at rapprochement or negotiation between Washington and Tehran.
The difficulty for Trump to reach an agreement with Iran that does not include the nuclear program, along with Netanyahu's efforts to disrupt any possibility for a solution on the eve of elections, may push Iran towards taking more escalatory steps, this time in the nature of its relationship with the "International Atomic Energy Agency," especially if it feels that the option of war is advancing over the option of negotiation. Iran may announce the suspension of its membership in the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" without withdrawing, which means entering into a more complex nuclear ambiguity, in addition to disrupting any possibility for the agency's activities on Iranian territory, without resorting to military manufacturing during this phase.
Quoted from Independent Arabia
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